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I. INTRODUCTION
Do U.S. citizens have the same rights to bring civil claims for violations of
the law of nations in United States' federal courts as a matter of federal
common law I under the general federal question jurisdiction statute as
non-citizens do under the Alien Tort Statute 2 (ATS)? The ATS, enacted
in 1789, allows aliens, but not U.S. citizens,3 to bring private tort4 claims for
violations of the law of nations, or customary international law,' in U.S.
federal courts as a matter of federal common law; in other words, aliens may
bring the private claims without any statutory authorization.6
The U.S. Supreme Court indicated skepticism about whether the general
federal question jurisdictional statute, enacted in 1875, 7 provides similar
jurisdiction in its 2004 landmark ATS case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.s In
Sosa, the Court found that although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute only,
and thus does not create a cause of action, federal courts can adjudicate certain
' Federal common law refers to common law developed by the federal courts. As discussed
later in this Article, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) stated that general federal
common law no longer exists, although certain limited enclaves of federal common law do
currently exist, including in the area of the law of nations.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The Alien Tort Statute reads, "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The ATS is also sometimes referred to as the
Alien Tort Claims Act, or ATCA. The ATS was enacted as Section 9 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The Act is commonly referred to as the First Judiciary Act.
' Given the clear language ofthe statue which states only aliens can bring such claims under
the ATS, this is true even if the U.S. citizen wanting to bring the claim was an alien at the time
the violation took place, but later became a citizen. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Moreover, no
case has held that a U.S. citizen who was formerly an alien has standing to bring a suit under the
ATS.
' In the eighteenth century, the word "tort" typically referred to a wrong or injury in general,
lacking the separation between civil torts and crimes that we see now in domestic law in the
United States. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d
ed. 1989).
' The "law of nations" is generally equated with customary international law. Flores v. S.
Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003); The Estrella, 17 U.S. 298, 307-08
(1819) (referring to non-treaty based law of nations as the "the customary. .. law of nations").
6 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Of course, the courts must still
have personal jurisdiction over any defendant. Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604
(1990).
The statute reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
8 542 U.S. at 731 n.19.
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private claims in violation of the law of nations under the ATS as part of their
common law power.9 This is so, the Court found, because the ATS was
"enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would exercise
jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of
nations,"' and that such claims "would have been recognized within the
common law" at the time the statute was enacted in 1789." The Court stated,
however, "[W]e know of no reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction
was extended subject to any comparable congressional assumption."' 2 Yet the
question was not briefed and remains unexplored. 3 Moreover, no scholar has
yet taken the challenge to explore the Court's assumption.
This Article demonstrates that the Court's assumption was likely erroneous,
at least with regard to claims for violations of the law of nations that have the
9 Id. at 714, 724-25.
'0 Id. at 731 n.19.
" Id. at 714, 720-21.
12 Id. at 731 n. 19. In addition, Professor William Casto, a well-respected scholar that the
Supreme Court cited often in Sosa, suggested in a recent article that federal courts' jurisdiction
over common law claims for violation of the law of nations has not received implicit
authorization by congressional action, although he acknowledges that passage of the Torture
Victim Protection Act in 1991, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 934 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2000)) demonstrates implicit congressional approval for treating American and alien
plaintiffs the same for purposes of creating remedies for certain violations of the law of nations.
William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of
International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 666-67 (2006).
13 Prior to Sosa, most lower federal courts faced with the question of whether § 1331
provides federal courts with jurisdiction to hear such claims have avoided deciding the issue
because the plaintiffs in the cases were almost always aliens, and thus § 1350 was available to
them. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,246 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 887 n.22 (2d Cir. 1980); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 273
(D.N.J. 1999); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193-96 (D. Mass. 1995). Several courts
found that such jurisdiction exists under § 1331 or suggest that it likely exists. See
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888, n.22; Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 127
(E.D.N.Y. 2000); Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 1:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814304, at *3-4
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 1993), aff'd, 72 F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 1996); Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason,
No. C-87-2057 SC, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19470, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 1988); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538, 1543-44 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Two courts expressed their
reservations about whether § 1331 provides jurisdiction; however, both rested their reservations
on the assumption that federal common law does not recognize private causes of action under
the law of nations, an assumption no longer valid after Sosa. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J. concurring); Xuncax, 886 F.
Supp. at 193-94.
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potential to impact foreign affairs. It concludes that general federal question
jurisdiction was in fact likely "enacted on the congressional understanding that
[federal] courts would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining some common law
claims derived from the law of nations" 4 where such could impact foreign
affairs. 5
Under what circumstances such violations could "impact foreign affairs"
is, like the term itself, somewhat ambiguous and not subject to easy
categorization, especially in our ever-changing and increasingly interconnected
world. As discussed within this Article, "affecting foreign relations"
historically often meant creating cause for war, affecting diplomatic relations,
or affecting the nation's relationships with foreign powers. The term
"affecting foreign relations" or affairs, for purposes of § 1331 jurisdiction in
today's world, would be defined the same. However, the types of claims that
might affect the nation's relationship with foreign powers or diplomatic
relations are likely to be somewhat broader, given our increasingly globalized
world. For example, the wholly domestic use of torture or extrajudicial killing
arguably affects foreign affairs today, even if it might not have two hundred
years ago. In addition, circumstances that might not have been common two
hundred years ago, such as a domestic corporation's involvement in human
rights abuses surrounding mineral extractions abroad, would likely fit within
the phrase "affecting foreign relations." It is also arguable that a violation of
any law found to be customary international law could "affect foreign
Since Sosa, the only circuit court to rule on this question found that § 1331 does provide
such jurisdiction. Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 178 (1st Cir. 2005).
However, in Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26,38 (D.C.C. 2006), aff'dsub noma. Rasul v.
Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the district court found that § 1331 did not provide
jurisdiction because it did not confer a cause of action. Interestingly, the court did not cite the
Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, but another pre-Sosa district court case, Schneider v.
Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D.D.C. 2004), which also found that § 1331 did not
provide a cause of action. The court provided no analysis of the question.
14 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19.
"S One could be tempted to make an argument that because the Court previously concluded
in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972), that "laws" within the meaning of
§ 1331 embraced claims founded on federal common law, and because it is now accepted that
federal common law recognizes the law of nations, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25, claims for
violations of the law of nations fall within § 1331 's jurisdiction. However, a review of Sosa,
along with an understanding of the Court's holdings regarding authorization of claims discussed
earlier, directs the inquiry to whether a claim under federal common law actually exists. This
depends on Congress' authorization of such claims, which in turn depends on whether Congress
assumed such private claims would exist and enacted federal question jurisdiction on such an
understanding.
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relations." However, it is important to realize that the concept is fluid and one
that a court will likely find itself having to adjudicate in determining whether
federal jurisdiction under § 1331 exists.
Part II of this Article discusses the Court's analysis in Sosa, as well as the
question it points scholars and practitioners to address in determining whether
the enactment of federal question jurisdiction authorized federal courts to
recognize private claims for violations of the law of nations: whether Congress
understood that such would be the case.
In addressing this question, Part I examines (1) the congressional history
of federal question jurisdiction, and in particular, Congress' desire that federal
jurisdiction be expanded to the degree allowed by Article III of the
Constitution; (2) Congress' likely view in 1875 that our country's Founders
understood that the "law of the United States" included the law of nations, at
least where such claims could implicate foreign affairs; (3) Congress' view of
its own history, which would have indicated that from the birth of our
country's judiciary, Congress had consistently strived to ensure that federal
courts would have jurisdiction, albeit not always exclusively, over causes of
action that could implicate foreign relations; (4) the developing federal
common law of the time; and (5) the philosophy of the chief architect of
federal questionjurisdiction, Senator Matthew Carpenter, 6 which would likely
have led him to ensure that federal courts have jurisdiction over claims
involving the law of nations, but only where such claims could impact foreign
affairs. Part Ill concludes that in 1875, Congress likely believed that claims
for violations of the law of nations where such could affect foreign
affairs-and likely only where such was the case-fell within Article III's
provisions, and thus intended federal questionjurisdiction to include claims for
violations of the law of nations where such claims could affect foreign affairs.
Part IV demonstrates that in enacting federal question jurisdiction,
Congress understood that federal courts would recognize private claims for
violations of the law of nations as part of their federal common law power. As
Part IV discusses, this was because throughout the 1800s, including the era in
6 Senator Matthew Hale Carpenter of Wisconsin sponsored and managed the Act of
March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, which established federal question jurisdiction, and was
its likely author. See Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 366 n.22 (1959)
(citing Jon B. Cassoday, Matthew Hale Carpenter, 7 REPORTS OF THE WIS. STATE BAR
ASS'N 155, 186 (1906)), superseded by statute as stated in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498
U.S. 19, 32 (1990). Senator Carpenter's first name is sometimes spelled Mathew, rather than
Matthew, in historical and even modem documents. At the time, he went more often by Matt,
as in Senator Matt Carpenter. Cassoday, supra, at 156.
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which federal jurisdiction was enacted, both federal and state courts routinely
exercised their common law powers to recognize private claims, including
claims for violations of the law of nations.
Part V argues that the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 7 wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court held that there no longer existed any general federal
common law, did not preclude federal courts from recognizing private claims
for violations of the law of nations, at least where such claims impact foreign
affairs, because such claims remain an enclave of federal common law that
survived Erie. In fact, as the Supreme Court stated in Sosa, no development
in the last two centuries has precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim
under the law of nations as an element of common law."
Finally, Part V addresses the implications of federal courts having
jurisdiction over, and recognizing private claims for, violations of the law of
nations where such claims could impact foreign affairs.'9 The first implication
is that recognizing these claims will rectify the unfairness that currently exists
with non-citizens having more rights than citizens in federal courts, an
outcome Congress most certainly did not intend. The second implication is
that providing federal jurisdiction over these claims will ensure greater
consistency in cases that might affect foreign affairs, as well as greater
consistency in the application of the political question and act of state
doctrines.2"
I. BACKGROUND AND THE QUESTION PRESENTED
A. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Court's Analysis Regarding
Authorization of Private Claims as a Matter of Common Law
In Sosa, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with the question of
whether the ATS created a cause of action or whether it was a jurisdictional
17 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
's Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25.
'9 If the Supreme Court ultimately decides that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide
jurisdiction for private claims for violation of the law of nations, then the law of nations is a
body of federal common law, or simply a body of law, that federal courts could and should apply
in alienage cases-cases in which one party is an alien and the other a U.S. citizen.
20 The political question doctrine is a jurisdictional doctrine based on a violation of the
constitutional separation of powers of government, wherein a court finds that the issue sought
to be adjudicated should be deferred to the legislative or executive branch of government. Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962). For act of state doctrine, see infra note 31.
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statute only. After finding that the statute was jurisdictional only,2 the Court
addressed the question of whether an alien could bring a private claim under
the ATS as a matter of federal common law, or whether such claims could only
be brought under the ATS pursuant to a congressional statute authorizing such
claims.22 After an in-depth historical analysis, the Court concluded that in
enacting the ATS, Congress authorized federal courts to recognize certain
private claims 23 derived from the law of nations as a matter of common law
because such claims would have been recognized within the common law at
the time the ATS was enacted in 1789.24 Moreover, the Court found that "no
development" since that time had "categorically precluded federal courts from
recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of common law."25
In addition, the Court found its holding consistent with the division of
responsibilities between federal and state courts set forth in the landmark 1938
case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.26 In Erie, the Court held that there was
no general federal common law, and that in cases where it had jurisdiction due
to diversity of citizenship,27 the federal courts should apply state common
law. 28 The Court recognized in Sosa that although general federal common
law may no longer exist after Erie, the law of nations continues to be one of
the "limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law
in a common law way," given that "[flor two centuries we have affirmed that
the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations., 29 The
Supreme Court has also stated that "international disputes implicating... our
relations with foreign nations" is an area of law that continues to exist as an
2 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
22 Id.
23 The Court held that any claim brought today for violation of the law of nations under the
ATS must "rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms" recognized at the
time. Id. at 725. This is arguably the same standard employed by many federal courts prior to
Sosa: the requirement that any international norm such claims rest upon be specific, universal,
and obligatory. In fact, the Sosa Court noted its test is consistent with those of prior courts,
citing them with approval. Id. at 732.
24 Id. at 714, 724, 731 n.19.
23 Id. at 724-25.
26 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27 The relevant code provision that provides forjurisdiction based on diversity ofcitizenship
is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
28 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. The Court held that state law should be applied in cases where the
Court has jurisdiction due to diversity except in matters governed by the United States
Constitution or by acts of Congress. Id.
29 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
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enclave of federal common law.3" In fact, after Erie, the Court recognized it
still had authority under federal common law to apply the law of nations and
to develop a common law rule of decision-the act of state doctrine-because
such was so important to foreign relations.3
However, in Sosa, the Court further stated, "[o]ur position does not...
imply that every grant of jurisdiction to a federal court carries with it an
opportunity to develop common law (so that the grant of federal-question
jurisdiction would be equally as good for our purposes as § 1350).,,32 The
Court explained that the ATS was "enacted on the congressional understanding
that courts would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining some common law
claims derived from the law of nations; and we know of no reason to think that
federal-question jurisdiction was extended subject to any comparable
congressional assumption. 33 Moreover, the Court questioned whether finding
"a more expansive common law power related to"§ 1331 would be consistent
with Erie.34
The Court did not analyze these questions in any detail, however, and by
no means dismissed the possibility that § 1331 might provide jurisdiction for
certain private claims in violation of the law of nations. Rather, the Court's
analysis suggests that such common law claims could exist under § 1331 if
Congress authorized them. 35 This reasoning is consistent with the 1972
30 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,641 (1981), citedwith approval
in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730.
3" See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426-28 (1964). The act of state
doctrine dictates that "[e] very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory." Id. at 416 (quoting Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
32 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19.
33 Id.
34 Id.
31 See id. at 728-31. There seems to be agreement, for the most part, that congressional
authorization is necessary for a federal court to recognize or create a remedy for the violation.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 853-56 (1997); Beth
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 435-36 (1997). The issue is whether the authorization needs to be
explicit, see for example, Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at 856-57, or whether it can be implicit
through congressional understanding and the Constitution's division of responsibilities-in this
case, providing that the federal government has power over matters concerning international
affairs. Stephens, supra, at 436-48.
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Supreme Court case of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,36 where the Court held
that federal question jurisdiction "will support claims founded upon federal
common law," because federal common law is now considered law of the
United States.37
This authorization of claims, the Sosa Court suggests, in turn depends on
whether Congress understood such claims would exist when it enacted federal
question jurisdiction.38
1. The Sosa Analysis Is Consistent with Prior Case Law
The analysis employed by the Court and the test it suggests for determining
whether § 1331 provides jurisdiction to federal courts to recognize violations
of the law of nations-whether Congress understood such would be the case
and thus implicitly authorized such claims-is consistent with the prior
holdings of the Supreme Court recognizing private causes of action.39 In
addition, there have been occasions when the Court has recognized causes of
action where the Court found that Congress assumed such remedies were
available,4" or where the Court found an implied action existed because such
private claims had been allowed previously.4 Although these occasions
involved congressional assumptions when enacting statutes, there is no reason
the same analysis should not apply to common law claims. In fact, the analysis
should be more applicable to claims arising from the common law because
with private claims presumed to arise from statutes, Congress had the
36 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (concluding "laws" within the
meaning of § 1331 embraced claims founded on federal common law (citing Romero v. Int'l
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393) (Breman, J., dissenting and concurring)). In the
case, Illinois filed a lawsuit against four cities alleging that they were polluting Lake Michigan
and creating a public nuisance; Illinois asked the lower courts to abate the nuisance. Id. at 93.
17 Id. at 100.
38 See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 passim.
39 See, e.g., Karahalois v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Cannon
v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979); see also ERWtN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 377-83 (3d ed. 1999).
40 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 380
(1982).
41 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). See also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 39, at 383.
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opportunity when it drafted the statute to create a cause of action, but did not
do so. With federal common law, Congress had no similar opportunity.
B. The Question: When Congress Enacted Federal Question Jurisdiction, Did
It Understand that Federal Courts Would Have Jurisdiction over, and Use
Their Common Law Power to Recognize Private Claims for, Violations of the
Law of Nations?
Given the Sosa analysis, the appropriate question is whether § 1331 "was
enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would exercise
jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of
nations."'42 In other words, did Congress understand when it enacted federal
question jurisdiction in 1875 that federal courts would recognize private claims
for violations of the law of nations as a matter of common law, thus implicitly
authorizing the federal courts to do so?
This question, in turn, contains two separate but interrelated questions.
First, did Congress intend that federal question jurisdiction would include
claims involving the law of nations? Second, did Congress understand that
federal courts would exercise this jurisdiction by recognizing private claims
for violations of the law of nations as a matter of common law, i.e., without
specific statutory authority?
This Article answers both questions affirmatively. It concludes that when
Congress enacted federal question jurisdiction in 1875, it likely intended that
claims involving violations of the law of nations-at least those which had the
potential to affect foreign relations-would be within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Additionally, Congress likely understood that federal courts
would exercise their common law power to recognize private claims for
violations of the law of nations which could affect foreign relations.
The Article bases its final conclusion on the following conclusions
discussed in detail within the Article. First, the historical record strongly
suggests that Congress, in 1875, intended that federal question jurisdiction be
as broad as the Founders meant to permit under Article III. The historical
record also suggests that Congress, in 1875, believed that the Founders viewed
the law of nations as both the law of the states but also as law of the United
States, especially where claims involving the law of nations could impact
foreign affairs. Second, it appears that from the birth of our country's
judiciary, Congress sought to ensure that federal courts had jurisdiction over
42 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19.
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any claims that might impact foreign relations. Third, this understanding is
consistent with the trend that emerged in the latter part of the 1800s, when
federal courts asserted common law power over claims affecting uniquely
federal interests, thereby invoking an emerging body of federal common law.43
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, just as Congress understood in 1789,
when it enacted the ATS, that federal courts would recognize private claims
for certain violations of the law of nations as a matter of common law-i.e.,
without the need for a statute authorizing the claim--Congress likely had a
similar understanding in 1875 when it enacted general federal jurisdiction. In
fact, as part of their common law power, both federal and state courts regularly
recognized private causes of action, including claims for violations of the law
of nations."
In. IN ENACTING FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION IN 1875, CONGRESS
LIKELY INTENDED FEDERAL COURTS TO HAVE JURISDICTION OVER,
AND TO USE THEIR COMMON LAW POWER TO RECOGNIZE PRIVATE
CLAIMS FOR, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, BUT ONLY
WHERE SUCH CLAIMS COULD IMPACT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A. General History of Federal Question Jurisdiction
Although Article III of the Constitution authorized Congress to broadly
confer jurisdiction upon federal courts for claims "arising under" the laws or
Constitution of the Unites States,45 Congress refrained from doing so for
nearly one hundred years.46 However, in 1875, Congress granted federal
" See Stephens, supra note 35, at 416-25 (discussing multiple cases in which the Court used
common law to adjudicate issues dealing with federal interests).
44 Id. at 416-17.
45 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
' During this time the federal courts had very limited jurisdiction, but such limited
jurisdiction, as discussed in more detail below, included the types of cases that Congress
believed could impact foreign affairs. It should be noted, however, in 1801, general federal
question jurisdiction did exist for one year. Congress had created federal question jurisdiction
for the inferior courts in the "Midnight Judges Act," which substantially tracked the language
from Article III of the Constitution: "[T]he said circuit courts respectively shall have cognizance
of... all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4,
§ 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. This Act, however,
was repealed one year later. Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our
Policy: Why the Well Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purpose of Federal Question
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question jurisdiction (where the amount in controversy exceeded five hundred
dollars) to the inferior federal courts with the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875."7
The original text of the statute provided for original jurisdiction "of all suits
of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.... . 48 There have
been slight changes in the language over the years,49 and in 1980, Congress
removed the "amount in controversy" requirement, which at that time was ten
thousand dollars.50 The general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, now reads, "The district courts shall have jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'"
Unfortunately, there is little legislative history for the general federal
question jurisdiction provision of the 1875 Act, particularly history explaining
its purpose and the types of actions Congress expected to be incorporated
within the term "arising under. '12 Just as surprising, there was no mention of
this expansive broadening of federal jurisdiction in the legal literature of the
time." Neither is it mentioned in the book about the life of the bill's floor
manager and likely author, Senator Matthew Carpenter. 4
Notwithstanding this dearth of information, some scholars opine that the
Act most likely reflected the new wave of federalism and widespread
expansion of federal judicial power that occurred after the Civil War" or "the
Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 601 (1987).
" Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
48 id. § 1.
49 Doernberg, supra note 46, at 606.
so Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (note 1980 amendments).
Sl 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
52 Doernberg, supra note 46, at 603. See also Stewart Jay, Origins ofFederal Common Law:
Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1231, 1315 (1985) (noting that "the Court has treated the 'arising
under' " clause "as a charge to develop a federal common law of judicial jurisdiction");
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 265 (noting that the legislative history of § 1331 is "skimpy").
" In fact, an exhaustive review of the legal and periodical literature of the time found no
references to what is now seen as revolutionary. Felix Frankfurter, in his famous 1925 article,
The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States - A Study in the Federal Judicial
System, 39 HARV. L. REv. 35, 44 n.34 (1925-1926) similarly notes that no legal periodicals of
the time discussed this new federal jurisdictional power.
54 See generally FRANK ABIAL FLOWER, LIFE OF MATTHEW HALE CARPENTER (3d ed.,
Madison, David Atwood & Company 1884).
'5 James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U.
PA. L. REv. 639, 645 (1942) (quoting Frankfurter, supra note 53, at 44, n.34). See also HOWARD
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culmination of a movement... to strengthen the Federal Government against
the states."56 Another scholar suggests that the broad jurisdictional grant was
a reflection of the philosophy of the reconstruction period-the nation's desire
to have a growing economy, the significance of interstate commerce, and the
economic benefits of a uniform system of justice.57
Some scholars, however, suggest that the federal question jurisdiction
provision of the Act was a "sneak" piece of legislation, noting that the Act
"was originally introduced in the House of Representatives in the form of a bill
to amend the removal statute." 8 The Act was passed with little debate and
sent to the Senate.59  However, once in committee, it underwent a
"metamorphosis," and another bill was substituted. 60 That bill saw minimal
debate and was passed by the Senate on the day it was introduced. 6' After the
House rejected the Senate amendments, however, the bill went into conference
again.62 On March 3, the same day Congress was dealing with appropriations
matters and urgent last minute business, both the House and Senate approved
the revised bill without discussion.63 On the same day, the Presidential
signature was "hurriedly affixed."'  The original title of the bill was
"regulating the removal of causes from the State courts, 65 but was changed
after its passage to "An Act to determine thejurisdiction of circuit courts of the
United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from State courts, and for
other purposes. ' '66
The theory of federal question jurisdiction being a "sneak" piece of
legislation, however, contradicts the other scholars' views, referenced above,
FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 7 (2d ed. 1984).
Although it may seem that federal question jurisdiction made the other grants of jurisdiction
seem superfluous given its breadth, it is important to recognize that until 1980, § 1331 contained
an amount in controversy requirement; thus, other specific grants ofjurisdiction were still very
important until 1980.
56 Frankfurter, supra note 53, at 44 n.34 (describing the comment of one anonymous writer
at the time).
57 See, e.g., STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION PoLITics 143-60
(1968).
58 Chadboum & Levin, supra note 55, at 642-43.
'9 Id. at 643.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 Id.
65 Id.
6 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
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that the expansion of federal judicial power was quite intentional. It also
seems to contradict the very vocal arguments set forth in the Congressional
Record by the bill's floor manager and drafter, Senator Carpenter, that the Act
should provide the federal courts with the entire jurisdiction allowed under
Article III, which had historically been viewed quite broadly.67 In fact, it is
difficult to believe that those concerned about state power would have simply
missed this very important-even radical-provision or stayed quiet about it,
given its importance. It is more likely that given the Civil War and the strong
trend toward federalism, it was just simply not controversial. In fact, it seems
that during this time, Congress supported any legislation that gave more power
to the federal government and to the federal courts, not withstanding concerns
about states' rights vocalized by certain members of congress. This can be
seen, for example, with the passage of Civil Rights Act of 1875, which passed
on the same day as federal question jurisdiction.68
In any event, although the legislative history of the Act is minimal, a review
of the congressional record and a legal text published around the time reveals
that Congress likely intended to broaden federal jurisdiction to the broad
degree allowed by Article III of the Constitution. In fact, the congressional
record indicates that Senator Carpenter took an unequivocal public position on
the Senate floor that general federal question jurisdiction should be as
expansive as allowed under Article III,69 and the Senate probably understood
that such was the intent of the bill.
B. Congress Intended Federal Question Jurisdiction to Confer Jurisdiction on
Federal Courts as Expansive as that Allowed under Article III
A strong argument can be made that the author of the bill providing for
general federal question jurisdiction, Senator Carpenter, intended such
jurisdiction to be as broad as Article II allowed, and that Congress understood
this would be the case. First, the original language of the bill, set forth above,
substantially tracked the constitutional language of Article I1 of the
Constitution.7" Second, as others have noted,7 Senator Carpenter declared his
67 See, e.g., Osbom v. Bank ofthe U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,822 (1824); Verlinden B.V.
v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983).
68 See Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 3, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875).
69 See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
70 Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
71 See, e.g., Jay, supra note 52, at 1314; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 265; Doemberg,
supra note 46, at 603; Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights
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intent regarding its breadth by stating, "The [Judiciary] [A]ct of 1789 did not
confer the whole [judicial] power which the Constitution conferred .... This
bill does. . . . This bill gives precisely the power which the Constitution
confers-nothing more, nothing less."72
Moreover, an in-depth review of the congressional record reveals with even
more clarity than scholars have heretofore suggested, that the Act was intended
to confer jurisdiction equal to that provided for in the Constitution. Senator
Carpenter's above statement was not the only indication of his intent. The
record contains much more to indicate how strongly he felt and how clearly he
believed that federal jurisdiction should be broadened to the extent allowed
under Article HI. For example, Senator Carpenter stated, "Th[e] present bill
is intended to confer a jurisdiction just as it is conferred in the Constitution,
without that limitation."73 Moreover, it seems he believed that the Constitution
actually required-not just allowed--Congress to ensure federal jurisdiction
to the degree set forth in Article 111." He felt that Congress had actually
contravened the Constitution in 1789 when it passed the First Judiciary Act by
not doing what he believed it was required to do." He argued that it was
Congress' duty in 1875, just as it had been in 1789, to vest all of the judicial
power of the Union in the federal court to the full extent provided by the
Constitution.76
Senator Carpenter, notwithstanding his view that the First Congress did not
do what it was required to do, noted that the passage of the First Judiciary Act
may have made sense in 1789, but it did not in 1875. "Everything has
changed," he noted; the Union had grown from thirteen states to thirty-seven,
commerce streamed "up and down the Atlantic," and people were traveling all
over the country because they could return quickly and efficiently.77 He
continued:
[T]he time has now arrived it seems to me when Congress ought
to do what the Supreme Court said more than forty years ago it
was its duty to do, vest the power which the Constitution confers
in some court of original jurisdiction. Our circuit court is the
Paradigm, 73 MrN'N. L. REv. 349, 365 n.78 (1988).
72 2 CONG. REc. 4986-87 (1874).
71 Id. at 4986.
74 See id. at 4984-86.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 4986.
77 Id. at 4986-87.
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only one of original jurisdiction in civil cases, and there it
properly belongs.78
Senator Carpenter was a well-regarded lawyer of his time and was
recognized as one of the leading constitutionalists in the nation after having
argued several significant constitutional cases before the Supreme Court. He
argued his first case before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1862. 7" In 1868, he
acquired nationwide recognition in Ex Parte McCardle,s° where he
demonstrated his knowledge of complex jurisdictional issues, and he was
eventually acknowledged to be the leading legal advocate for reconstruction
policies.8' His other well-known cases include his representation of the state
of Louisiana in the famous Slaughter-House Cases82 in 1872, where the
Supreme Court adopted his argument that the Fourteenth Amendment's
privileges and immunities clause did not restrict the police powers of the state
to centralize all slaughterhouses within the city of New Orleans in order to
prevent dumping of remains in waterways.
In addition to being a well-respected constitutional lawyer, Senator
Carpenter was also a powerful figure in the Senate, having been elected
president pro tempore on December 11, 1873, holding the position for the
remainder of his two years as a Senator.83
Moreover, many other members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
Committee out of which the bill arose, were lawyers, law professors, and
judges. The Supreme Court has described the members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee during the drafting and enactment of the Act of March 3, 1875 as
follows:
Among Senator Carpenter's collaborators on the Senate Judiciary
Committee were men with outstanding professional experience
as lawyers, professors of law and judges: George G. Wright of
78 Id. at 4987.
7 Wisconsin Historical Society, Dictionary of Wisconsin History, Carpenter, Matthew Hale,
http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/dictionary/index.asp?action=view&termid=2138&keyword=
Carpenter (last visited Oct. 14, 2008).
80 74 U.S. 506 (1868). Senator Carpenter argued that Congress had the power to remove the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over certain habeas corpus cases.
81 Wisconsin Historical Society, supra note 79. See generally FLOWER, supra note 54.
82 Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co. (Slaughter-House Cases), 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
83 FLOWER, supra note 54, at 445 n.1.
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Iowa (a professor of law and a member of his State's Supreme
Court), Allen G. Thurman (Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme
Court), John W. Stevenson (a professor of law, codifier of the
law of Kentucky, President of the American Bar Association),
and Frederic T. Frelinghuysen (eminent practitioner, Attorney
General of New Jersey, subsequently Secretary of State). After
leaving the Senate the bill went to conference and was reported
out on the floor of the House by Luke Poland of Vermont, an
esteemed Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court. 4
Finally, all of the senators who spoke either for or against the bill (and as
mentioned previously, the section on general federal question jurisdiction was
not a portion of the bill that was spoken out against) studied law and were
members of their respective state bars.
Given the above, Senator Carpenter and other members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, as well as many members of the Senate, almost certainly
understood that Article III had been previously interpreted quite broadly by the
Supreme Court86 and that the jurisdiction being proposed was intended to be
as equally broad.87
1. Scholars, Practitioners, and the Supreme Court of the Era Also Viewed
the Act as Providing Jurisdiction Equally as Broad as Article III
The only identified contemporary article on federal jurisdiction still in
existence, an article from the Central Law Journal in 1875, concludes that
Congress intentionally gave federal courts the entire jurisdiction conferred by
84 Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 366 n.22.
85 See 2 CONG. REc. 4987 (1874) (listing members of the Senate who discussed the bill and
supported it as George F. Edmunds, (R - VT), Oliver H.P.T. Morton (R - Indiana), Rosco
Conkling (R - New York), and those who discussed the bill and did not support it on grounds
unrelated to the enactment of general federal question jurisdiction as Thomas F. Bayard (D -
Delaware), John S. Hager (D - California), Augustus S. Merrimon (D -North Carolina), Eli M.
Saulsbury (D - Delaware), John P. Stockton (D - New Jersey), Bainbridge Wadleigh (R - New
Hampshire)). For the professions and state bar membership of each of the men, see Biographical
Directory of the United States Congress 1774-Present, http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/
biosearch.asp.
86 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
87 Given the trend of the era to place as much power as possible with the federal government,
the lack of debate concerning the expansion of federal jurisdiction most likely reflected the
simple fact that the issue was not controversial.
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the Constitution to protect against states thwarting Congress' reconstruction
efforts after the Civil War.88 A leading practitioner in the late 1800s also noted
that the federal question jurisdiction statute conferred federal jurisdiction to
the degree allowed in the Constitution. 9
In fact, although it involved the removal provision of the March 3, 1875 Act
rather than the federal question provision, the Supreme Court, in the 1880 case
New Orleans, Mobile & Texas Railroad Co. v. Mississippi,90 equated the term
"arising under" for purposes of Article I and the Act of March 3, 1875 as the
same.91
The Supreme Court has since interpreted § 1331 more narrowly, 92 but a
strong argument can be made that Congress in 1875 intended federal question
jurisdiction to be as equally broad as Article IH.9'
C. Congress in 1875 Likely Believed that Article IIAllowed Jurisdiction over
Claims for Violations of the Law ofNations Where Such Claims Could Impact
Foreign Affairs
Given that Congress likely intended to give jurisdiction to the federal courts
to the entire extent allowed under Article HI, the next question becomes
88 A.I., Our FederalJudiciary, 2 CENT. L.J. 551,553 (1875), described in Doemberg, supra
note 46, at 603 n.27.
89 HowARD M. CARTER, THE JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS, AS LIMITEDBYCrITIZENSHIP
AND RESIDENCE OF THE PARTIES 145-46 (WM. S. Hein Publishing 1983) (1899) (noting that
with the Act of March 3, 1875, "for the first time the jurisdiction of these courts was
extended.., to the limits of the constitutional grant." (citing a lower federal court case of the
era, Van Patten v. Chicago M & St. Paul R.R. Co., 74 F. 981, 984 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1896))). It
is also important to note that Felix Frankfurter, who later became a member of the Supreme
Court, stated in 1925 that, "In the Act of March 3, 1875, Congress gave the federal courts the
whole sweep of power which had lain dormant in the Constitution since 1789." Frankfurter,
supra note 53, at 44.
90 102 U.S. 135 (1880).
9' Id. at 136 ("The only inquiry therefore.., is... whether the present suit, looking to its
nature and object as disclosed by the record, is, in the sense of the Constitution, or within the
meaning of the act of 1875, one 'arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.' ").
92 See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515-16 (1969). See also Doemberg, supra note 46, at 608.
13 Given the scholarship which suggests that the Judiciary Act of 1875 was meant to give
federal courts as broad ofjurisdiction as the Constitution, many scholars believe the Court has
erred in its narrow interpretation. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 265. On the other hand,
supporters of the Court's narrow interpretation of § 1331 recognize that it would be virtually
impossible for the Court to interpret § 1331 's "arising under" language as broadly as it interprets
Article Ill's, or almost any case could be brought in federal court. Id.
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whether Congress in 1875 believed that Article III allowed for federal
jurisdiction over claims for violations of the law of nations. Given that little
legislative or other history exists regarding federal question jurisdiction, it
appears this is not a question that can be answered with any degree of
certainty. But it can be answered with a degree of likelihood, and this Article
concludes that for all the reasons set forth below, Congress likely believed that
Article III allowed for such jurisdiction, but only when claims for violations
of the law of nations had the potential to affect foreign affairs.
Before the enactment of federal question jurisdiction in 1875, no federal
court had decided whether "law of the United States" included the law of
nations for purposes of either federal appellate jurisdiction or Article III."
In 1871, the Supreme Court had directly considered the question, which was
extensively argued before the Court, in the context of federal appellate
jurisdiction in the case of Caperton v. Bowyer.9 5 However, it ultimately
refrained from deciding the issue.96 Although the case is discussed in more
detail below, it is worth mentioning here that it is hard to believe that Senator
Carpenter, given his background as a leading constitutional lawyer, as well as
the backgrounds of others serving on the Senate Judiciary Committee, were not
aware of Caperton and the issue it presented and left unresolved.
1. Congress Likely Believed that the Founders Viewed the Law of Nations
as Law ofthe United States, Even as They Viewed It Also as Law of the Several
States, Especially Where Such Impacted Foreign Affairs
At the time of the founding of the Constitution and the enactment of the
First Judiciary Act, the law of nations, like general common law, was not
categorized as uniquely federal law or state law but was seen as a general body
of law that belonged to the states separately,97 as well as to the United States
" Obviously, there was no occasion to decide whether the law of nations was "law of the
United States" for purposes of federal jurisdiction because no statute had yet given federal courts
jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the laws of the United States.
9' 81 U.S. 216 (1871). In the case, the Supreme Court was asked to decide, inter alia,
whether international law-the law of war in particular-raised a federal question for purposes
of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
96 The Court chose not to decide the issues, finding instead that the basis for jurisdiction was
not adequately raised or presented below, and thus it did not have the ability to decide the matter,
stating, "it is plain law that questions not presented in the court of last resort do not give
jurisdiction in a case like the one before the court." Id. at 236.
9' See 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 691, 692 (1802) ("The law of nations is considered as a part of the
municipal law of each State.").
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as a whole.9" As the Court in Sosa confirmed, the domestic law of the United
States "recognized" the law of nations in 1789 because it was seen as a type
of common law that transcended each individual state, as well as being
obligatory within each state." Thus, it was seen as a body of law that bound
the federal government, even as it bound each individual state. As discussed
in Part IV, both federal and state courts routinely applied the law of nations
when appropriate. As further discussed in Part IH.D, and Part IV, this
conception continued throughout most of 1800s.
Nonetheless, the law of nations was commonly referred to in the late 1700s
and early 1800s as "law of the United States."'' 0 This was likely because
questions involving the law of nations during that period typically arose in
cases over which only the federal courts had jurisdiction (or, with regard to
common law crimes, areas they believed they had jurisdiction over), such as
in admiralty, prize, attacks on diplomats, and like cases. Thus, the fact that the
law of nations was "law of the United States" for purposes of Article III was
likely a given, even though it was also likely seen as general public law
belonging to both the federal and state governments.' 0 '
In addition, one can make a very strong argument that Congress viewed the
law of nations as "law of the United States" for purposes of Article m, as
Professor William Dodge has done.' Professor Dodge cites numerous
documents and several of the federalist papers indicating that such is the
case.'0 3 Additionally, he notes the difference in language between Article IIn
and Article VI's Supremacy Clause, noting that the latter refers to "This
Constitution, and Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
" Stephens, supra note 35, at 410, 430-31; Jay, supra note 52, at 1266, 1270. See also
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute andArticle Ill, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 595 (2002). In
fact, a recognizable federal common law did not start emerging until the late nineteenth century.
Stephens, supra note 35, at 410, 430-3 1.
99 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
'° A series of Attorney General opinions throughout the 1800s-1822, 1855,
and 1865-demonstrate that the executive branch understood the law of nations was part of the
law of the United States and could be applied in federal courts. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 570
(1822); 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 495, 503 (1855); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299 (1865).
'0' Another scholar, Professor Stewart Jay, suggests that although the common law might not
have been viewed as the law of the United States during that era, the Founders nonetheless
viewed the law of nations as already binding and an unwritten part of the Constitution. In any
event, the Founders intended to ensure that all controversies affecting the interests of the United
States were within Article III's purview. Jay, supra note 52, at 1261-68.
012 William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations
on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 705-08 (2002).
103 Id.
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thereof," whereas the former only discusses "laws of the United States"
without reference to "pursuance thereof."'" He argues this distinction was
intentional and that it suggests that there must be a category of laws that are
not made "in pursuance" of the Constitution and yet are "laws of the United
States."' 5 The most obvious candidate, he suggests, is the law of nations. 6
a. The Early History of Federal Criminal Common Law Also
Demonstrates that the Law of Nations Was Seen Primarily as Law of the
United States
Early federal prosecutions of federal common law crimes also demonstrate
that the Founders viewed the law of nations as part of the common law of the
United States and exclusive to the federal judiciary. Moreover, as one leading
scholar notes, the Founders and early jurists believed that "all of the common
law pertinent to the enforcement of the law of nations naturally attached to the
federal government upon its creation."'0 7
Reflecting this, shortly after the establishment of the federal judiciary, the
federal government began prosecuting citizens for violations of the law of
nations as part of the common law of the United States, for crimes such as
piracy and crimes on the high seas, breaches of neutrality and attacks on
diplomats."'0 In these cases, the judges routinely stated that the law of nations
was part of the law of the United States,0 9 and their asserting jurisdiction over
such common law crimes"0 indicate that they further viewed crimes in
violation of the law of nations as uniquely federal rather than state crimes. In
response to growing criticism that the idea of federal common law might
provide Congress with unlimited power to legislate in whatever areas it
'04 Id. at 704-05.
105 Id. at 705.
106 Id.
107 WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 160 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1995).
0' See id. at 136-38. See for example Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793),
involving a privateer, who after bringing a French prize into Philadelphia, was arrested and
prosecuted for violating American neutrality in wars between the European powers.
"o See, e.g., Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1117; CASTO, supra note 107, at 131; cf
Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1105 n.2.
"o See, e.g., Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1117 (stating that because the law of nations is
part of the common law of the United States, Henfield and other like him are subject to common
law prosecution in federal court).
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chose,"' Chief Justice Ellsworth sought to preserve federal criminal common
law in particular areas, including for acts contravening the law of nations." 2
Ellsworth's views are particularly important, as he was on the committee that
drafted Article 1H, was the chief architect of the First Judiciary Act, and
drafted the ATS. 1 He, and others, saw the law of nations as an important part
of non-statutory federal law.
The doctrine of federal common law crimes came to an end in 1812 when
the Supreme Court held that federal courts lacked authority to punish non-
statutory common law crimes.' '4 However, even some of those who became
opponents of the idea of the general doctrine of federal common law crimes
believed that violations of the law of nations could be prosecuted in federal
courts.' The importance of this should not be understated, as it was in the
area of prosecutions for violations of the law of nations where the doctrine was
least controversial and had its broadest support." 6
2. In Addition, Congress' View of Its Own History of Legislation Would
Have Indicated that from the Birth of Our Country's Judiciary, Congress Has
Strived to Ensure that Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction over Claims that
Could Impact Foreign Affairs
In considering whether Congress in 1875 would have intended claims for
violation of the law of nations to fall within Article IH, it is important to
consider what Congress' view of its own history regarding claims for
violations of the law of nations would have been. A review of that history
demonstrates that from the birth of our country's judiciary, Congress has
consistently strived to ensure that federal courts have jurisdiction over causes
of action involving the law of nations that could implicate foreign relations.
That would have been the 1875 Congress' view as well.
CASTO, supra note 107, at 149-50.
1 See id. at 151-52 (citing Oliver Ellsworth, Charge to the South Carolina Grand Jury
(May 7, 1799)).
113 Id. at 14, 27-53.
114 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 39, at 350.
115 CASTO, supra note 107, at 135. For example, Henfield's Case was not very controversial
because it involved the potential impact on foreign relations. Id. at 160.
1 6 Id. at 160.
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The starting point is the Constitutional Convention of 1787, when the
founding generation was contemplating both the constitutional and initial
statutory scope of a federal judiciary.
a. Article III of the Constitution: Congress Ensured that Questions
Involving Foreign Affairs Could Be Heard by the Federal Judiciary
The drafting of the Constitution was, as one might expect, subject to
controversy regarding the role of the federal government, including the federal
judiciary. At the Constitutional Convention in the summer of 1787, one of the
most significant issues with respect to the judiciary was "the extent of the
national courts' constitutional authority to adjudicate cases," or in other words,
jurisdiction."7
Some opposed a strong central government and thus opposed a strong
federal judiciary. 18 Others wanted a strong central government and a strong
federal judiciary, which they believed would not only offset tendencies toward
"balkanization" of the states, but would guarantee that national interests would
be protected and advanced." 9
One of the major points of disagreement at the Constitutional Convention
was whether inferior federal courts should exist and what their jurisdictional
scope should be. 2° Some thought it was unnecessary and undesirable to have
lower federal courts, arguing that as long as state courts were subject to review
by the Supreme Court, the interests of the national government would be
protected.2 Others, however, distrusted the ability and willingness of the
state courts to uphold federal law, especially where there might be conflicting
state and federal interests.'22 They did not believe that simply having the
Supreme Court review certain state court decisions would be adequate because
they felt the number of such appeals would exceed the Court's limited capacity
to hear and decide such cases.'23
A compromise resulted in Article II mandating the existence of the
Supreme Court and defining the outer limits of federal judicial power through
117 Id. at 5.
118 See FiNK & TUSHNET, supra note 55, at 5.
119 Id.
120 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 2-3.
121 Id. at 3.
"I Id. at 2-3.
123 Id. at3.
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its subject matterjurisdiction. 124 Congress was left with and later exercised the
ability to create inferior courts and to confer the scope of federal jurisdiction
by statute.12 5 As part of the compromise, the drafters also agreed to refrain
from conferring the full extent of jurisdiction allowed under Article 1H in the
First Judiciary Act. 1
6
i. The Competing Drafts ofArticle III All Anticipated that Federal
Courts Would Have Jurisdiction over Claims Impacting Foreign Affairs
In outlining the constitutional limits onjurisdiction to be set forth in Article
II, the drafters considered a variety of arrangements that would preserve local
initiative and power, as well as protect national interests.' 7
However, given the political and legal landscape at the end of the
eighteenth century, all of the Founding Fathers wanted to ensure that foreign
affairs and national security issues were placed within the powers of the
federal government. 2  Thus, each of the plans regarding the judiciary,
although different in other significant ways, evidenced a firm consensus that
there should be federal jurisdiction over cases involving foreign affairs, such
as admiralty, including prize cases,2 9 and cases involving aliens. 30
At least three precipitating situations likely led to the Founders' strong
belief that matters involving violations of international law that could affect
foreign affairs should be vested with the federal judiciary. First, there was the
"Marbois affair" which involved an assault on a French diplomat by French
adventurer De Longchamps on the streets of Philadelphia in 1783.' The
international community was "outraged" and demanded that the Continental
Congress take action, but Congress lacked the authority to do anything under
the Articles of Confederation.12 Although he was successfully prosecuted by
124 CASTO, supra note 107, at 25-26.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 12-15, 27-31. See also infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
127 FINK& TUSHNET, supra note 55, at 3.
128 CASTO, supra note 107, at 6; Jay, supra note 52, at 1267-68, 1275.
129 CASTO, supra note 107, at 7. Prize cases involved a court's condemnation of property
seized from commercial enemy vessels during time ofwar and the court's decision about whether
such seizure was lawful. It was an important area of international law in the eighteenth century
that was seen as implicating national security concerns. Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 8. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716 (2004).
2008]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the state of Pennsylvania, 133 the event demonstrated the Continental Congress'
inability to remedy violations of the law of nations.
In fact, in 1781, the Continental Congress had called upon states to pass
legislation addressing the vindication of rights under the law of nations
because it felt "hamstrung" by its inability to" 'cause infractions of treaties,
or of the law of nations to be punished.' ""'4 After the Marbois incident,
Congress called again for states to enact legislation addressing international
law violations, and this concern over the inadequate vindication of the law of
nations continued through the time of the Constitutional Convention.'
The second event was the arrest of the Dutch Ambassador's coachman
in 1787,136 about which the Ambassador protested. 137 During the Convention,
members of Congress were informed about the Marbois affair and the Dutch
Ambassador's protest.'38 Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay explained to
Congress that" 'the federal government does not appear... to be vested with
any judicial Powers competent to the Cognizance and Judgment of such
Cases.' ""' As discussed below, "[t]he Framers responded by vesting the
Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over 'all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls.' "140
The third situation likely leading to federal jurisdiction over foreign affairs
involved enforcement of the Treaty of Paris that ended the Revolutionary
War.'4 ' The Treaty permitted British creditors to collect on pre-Revolutionary
War debts incurred by the then-colonists, a process the states had intentionally
made difficult during the war.'42 After the war, many American debtors
continued to refuse to pay their debts, and many legislatures and courts in
several states overtly cooperated with this refusal and ignored the Treaty.
43
... Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111 (Pa. Ct. of Oyer & Terminer 1784).
134 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716 (quoting JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 60 (E.H. Scott ed., Chicago, Albert, Scott & Co. 1893)).
... Id. at 717 (citing RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 25 (M. Farrand
ed., 1911)).
136 CASTO, supra note 107, at 43; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717.
137 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717 (citing William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective
Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 467, 494 n.152 (1986)).
138 Id.
139 Id.
"~ Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
141 CASTO, supra note 107, at 8.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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This had national security consequences, however, because under the Treaty,
the British had agreed to evacuate their military posts, and insisted that the
failure of the United States to comply with this aspect of the Treaty would
result in continued British occupation of the posts.'"
After the Convention passed a resolution which stated that, " 'the
jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws
passed by the general Legislature, and to such other questions as involve the
National peace and harmony,' ""' a five-person committee worked out
compromises and drafted the details.'
ii. The Resulting Language ofArticle III
In Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the drafters created the federal
judiciary and defined the outer constitutional limits on its powers. Section
One reads, "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."'47 Section Two provides that federal judicial power
shall extend to nine different categories:
[T]o all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;- to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and
Citizen of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and-between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.'
44Id. at 9. The compromise ultimately allowed state courts to hear claims under five
hundred dollars, which was the majority of such claims. See infra note 157 and accompanying
text.
145 CASTO, supra note 107, at 14 (emphasis added).
146 Id.
147 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
148 Id. § 2, cl. 2.
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The compromise resulted in the Supreme Court having original jurisdiction
over cases affecting diplomats and appellate jurisdiction over each of the nine
areas enumerated.'49 It also provided for the possibility of future creation of
inferior federal courts with jurisdiction over "claims arising under the
Constitution, Laws, or Treaties of the United States" and for specific types of
actions that could impact foreign affairs, such as admiralty and claims between
aliens and citizens. 5
0
Of course, these were the outer Constitutional limits; Congress still had to
authorize the jurisdiction through statutes. The resulting First Judiciary Act,
although providing for limited jurisdiction of the federal courts as agreed to in
the compromise,' 51 ensured the federal judiciary would have jurisdiction over
every type of case likely thought of at the time that might impact foreign
relations.'
b. The First Judiciary Act of 1789 Provided Jurisdiction over Those
Claims that Could Affect Foreign Affairs
Shortly after the Constitution was enacted, Congress passed the First
Judiciary Act, which in addition to setting forth the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, created federal circuit and district courts and outlined their
jurisdiction.'53 In drafting the Judiciary Act, the committee took into
consideration the same concerns regarding federal judicial power that the
Constitutional Convention faced, as well as the ensuing compromise.' 54 Thus,
there was no attempt to provide jurisdiction as broad as Article In of the
149 Id.
50 Id. art. III, § I & § 2, cl. 2. It is unclear why the Founders decided to limit Article III to
claims only between citizens and aliens, rather than any claims between two aliens, especially
given that De Longchamps involved two aliens. Interestingly, three of the original four plans
extended jurisdiction to all cases involving aliens. CASTO, supra note 107, at 7. The fourth plan
limited jurisdiction to maritime claims involving aliens and to cases involving treaties or the law
of nations. Id. In the First Judiciary Act discussed below, Congress provided for federal
jurisdiction for all claims over five hundred dollars involving aliens, which courts later declared
unconstitutional between two aliens, as such jurisdiction was outside Article III. This suggests
one of two things: either Congress simply made a mistake with regard to Article III and meant
for the Article to include all cases involving aliens, or Congress made a mistake with regard to
the First Judiciary Act, meaning to limit alienage cases to those between an alien and a citizen.
See Bradley, supra note 98, at 590-91.
... See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
'52 See Jay, supra note 52, at 1275, 1275 n.222.
... Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see also FINK & TUSHNET, supra note 55, at 6.
'54 CASTO, supra note 107, at 27.
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Constitution allowed. Yet, even though the initial jurisdictional grant was
narrow, Congress felt it was critical to provide federal jurisdiction in discrete
areas of federal concern,155 most of which were areas that could impact foreign
relations. For example, it reinforced the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
over suits involving diplomats. 56 With regard to the inferior courts, Congress
also created alienage jurisdiction for claims over five hundred dollars,'57
provided exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime, 158
and provided jurisdiction for aliens bringing tort claims in violation of the law
of nations. 151
In addition, the Act also gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction 6 °
over the decisions rendered by states' highest courts so long as they involved
the validity of a federal statute, treaty, or the construction of any clause of the
Constitution, statute, or treaty which affected any federal right, privilege, or
exemption claimed by any party. 6' It also gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction
to hear appeals where a plaintiff argued that a state statute was "repugnant to
the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States," and the state's highest
155 Id.
156 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13.
157 Id. § 11. The Act also allowed the removal of cases from state to federal court against an
alien defendant for claims in excess of five hundred dollars. Id. § 12. The five hundred dollars
requirement for claims involving aliens was, like nearly everything else, the result of a
compromise, which on this occasion involved the problem of British debt collections under the
Treaty ofParis. See discussion supra p. 81. By limiting jurisdiction over cases involving aliens
to claims in excess of five hundred dollars, a large majority of such litigation would be forced
to occur in state courts, which were much more sympathetic to the Americans. See CASTO, supra
note 107, at 8-9. Finally, as discussed above, this alienage provision did not comport with
Article III's alienage provision, which required that one party be an alien and one party be a
citizen. As further discussed below, this section of the First Judiciary Act was shortly thereafter
found to be unconstitutional as outside of Article III. It has never been determined how and why
Congress created this apparent inconsistency, but it does seem that Congress intended that all
cases which could impact foreign affairs or implicate the law of nations in ways that could
impact foreign affairs be within federal jurisdiction.
158 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9. For a variety of reasons, admiralty jurisdiction in particular was
an area for which there was little controversy because of the need for federal courts to have
jurisdiction over prize cases, given that much of prize existed during times of naval war. CASTO,
supra note 107, at 39-40.
9 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9.
"6 Federal appellate jurisdiction under Article III was quite broad and was likely interpreted
at the time to allow the Court to review and reverse state courts' interpretation of common law.
CASTO, supra note 107, at 36.
161 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25.
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court found it was not. 62 It is important to note that this section of the Act
uses the terms "statute" and "laws of the United States" separately, and treats
"law of the United States" distinct from the Constitution, indicating that the
drafters believed the "laws of the United States" included more than simply
statutes and the Constitution. This suggests that Congress might have thought
of common law and the law of nations as constituting non-statutory "law" of
the United States.
c. The Alien Tort Statute
As mentioned above, the First Judiciary Act provided federal courts with
jurisdiction, concurrent with states, 163 over cases where an alien sues for a
tort"6 in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 165
There is no record from which to ascertain with absolute certainty why such
jurisdiction was given; in fact, there is no record of any debate on this section
at all. 66 However, there does seem to be enough information to suggest it was
likely due to similar concerns regarding international law and foreign relations
expressed in Article III and in the provision of alienage jurisdiction. The
founders found it critical to ensure that the federal courts have jurisdiction
over aliens' claims for torts in violation of the law of nations-torts that most
likely at the time included piracy, attacks on diplomats, and safe
passage-' 67 because they were the type of violations that potentially
"threaten[ed] serious consequences in international affairs .... ,,68
162 Id.
163 That the jurisdiction is concurrent with the states likely reflects the fact that the law of
nations could also be applied by the states, and in fact was, as described below in Part III.
However, giving federal courts jurisdiction allows an alien to file his case in federal court, where
he might believe he will get a more fair trial.
64 The Act limits the claims to torts only (as opposed to commercial claims arising from a
violation of the law of nations or a treaty) due to the compromise involving the Treaty of Paris
and alienage jurisdiction. See supra note 157.
165 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9 ("[Tlhe district courts... shall also have cognizance, concurrent
with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where
an alien sues for a tort in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."). There
have been slight changes in the language over the years. Compare id., with 28 U.S.C. 1350
(2000).
16 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004).
167 See id. at 714-15.
168 Id. at 715.
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As with the Constitutional Convention, the drafters of the First Judiciary
Act continued to have incidents like the Marbois affair and the arrest of the
Dutch Ambassador's coachman in mind, as well as the need for Congress to
ensure compliance with the law of nations, given the states' failures to do so.' 69
The drafters also likely had in mind the problem that American citizens
continued to mount private military expeditions against Spanish territories in
Florida and to commit torts "against aliens who, under U.S. treaties, were
entitled to the free exercise of religion and to safe passage through the
country."'
70
Regardless of the exact reasons for the provision, there was a national
consensus that the federal courts should be open to any alien who had suffered
tortious injuries in violation of international law, and that the national interest
was so obvious that Congress used broad, open-ended language to vest the
federal courts with complete power over these cases.' 7 '
i. Enactment and Continued Existence of the Alien Tort Statute
Confirmed that Claims Implicating the Law of Nations Where Such Impacted
Foreign Affairs Was Likely Viewed as "Law of the United States" and thus
Within Article III
The passage of the ATS is also important to consider in ascertaining
whether Congress, in 1875, believed the Founders understood the "law of
nations" as the "law of the United States." To be sure, there is a debate among
scholars about whether the First Congress viewed the ATS as constitutional
under Article IH, due to the law of nations being viewed as law of the United
States, or whether it was constitutional due to Article Hl's alienage provision.
169 CASTO, supra note 107, at 43-44; see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716-18 (citing Kenneth C.
Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort
Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &POL. 1, 15-21 (1985)).
170 CASTO, supra note 107, at 43-44.
17, Id. From the First Judiciary Act's passage in 1789 until 1980, jurisdiction had been
upheld under the ATS in only two cases, one in 1795 and the other in 1961. See Bolchos v.
Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795); Adra v. Cliff, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). In fact, the
ATS was, for the most part, dormant for many years until the Center for Constitutional Rights
brought an action on behalf of a Paraguayan doctor and his daughter against a former military
leader who tortured their son and brother to death, after it was discovered that former military
leader resided in New York. In the case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit found that
the ATS provided subject matter jurisdiction over claims for torts in violation of the law of
nations, even where the tort occurred abroad and was perpetrated by an actor from the alien's
own government. 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Professor Curtis Bradley has strongly argued that Congress believed the ATS
was constitutional due to Article III's alienage provision.'72 He argues that
Congress either mistakenly believed that Article III's alienage provision
extended to any suit involving aliens, even where both parties were aliens, or
intended to limit suits to where the defendant was a U.S. citizen.' 73 Although
he cites evidence to support both possibilities, he gives the edge to the latter. 74
However, as discussed earlier, others, such as Professor Dodge, who
examined the constitutionality of the ATS in particular, 75 make strong
arguments that Article III's "laws of the United States" includes the law of
nations based on their own in-depth historical reviews.'76
In addition, it seems likely that the Founders did not assume the ATS was
constitutional under Article 1I due to the Article's alienage jurisdiction, which
allows for jurisdiction only when the case is between an alien and a citizen,
because the drafters did not specify that only citizens could be defendants; they
allowed for the possibility that either a citizen or a non-citizen could be a
defendant.'77 Moreover, and perhaps even more convincingly, it seems the
Founders assumed that the ATS would involve claims of a non-citizen against
another non-citizen for acts that occurred in the United States given that De
Longchamps was an impetus for the ATS, a case in which both the plaintiff
and defendant were non-citizens.
Perhaps more importantly, between 1800 and 1810, the Supreme Court
repeatedly found that Article III's alienage provision only provided for
jurisdiction over claims between an alien and a citizen, and not between two
aliens.'78 Yet, even after these cases, Congress never acted to repeal the ATS
as beyond Article III. In addition, no Court has since declared the ATS
unconstitutional. Thus, Congress in 1875 was on notice that the ATS was
constitutional under Article III, not due to alienage provisions, but because
claims involving the law of nations arise under the laws of the United States.
Finally, it is worth noting, the court in the seminal ATS case, Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, found the ATS to be constitutional based on the "laws of the
172 See Bradley, supra note 98, at 591, 619-37.
7 Id. at 591.
174 Id.
175 Dodge, supra note 102.
176 Id. at 689, 701-11.
'77 Id. at 691-92.
178 See, e.g., Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 12, 13-14 (1800); Montalet v.
Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46,47 (1807); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304
(1809).
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United States" provision of Article III, 7 a holding the Supreme Court let stand
in Sosa.8' In Sosa, where defendants included Mexican citizens, the Court did
not address the basis for the ATS' constitutionality under Article III, but cited
Filartiga approvingly. 8' Moreover, the Court stated, "For two centuries we
have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of
nations."'' 82 These facts indicate that the Supreme Court most likely agrees not
only with the predominate current view that the ATS is constitutional because
the law of nations is part of the "laws of the United States," but believes that
the Founders ascribed to this view as well.
d The Growth of Habeas Jurisdiction Also Reflected the Desire to
Ensure that Cases Which Could Affect Foreign Affairs Be Heard in Federal
Courts
Congress' expansion of jurisdiction in the area of habeas corpus in
the mid-1800s also demonstrates Congress' continued desire to ensure that
jurisdiction over claims which could affect foreign relations be vested in the
federal judiciary. For example, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1842, extending the benefit of habeas corpus to aliens imprisoned by a state
for acts done under the authority of a foreign nation. 83 Congress passed the
Act in response to a diplomatic impasse between the British and American
governments after the federal government noted it was unsure whether it had
the authority to demand that New York courts release Alexander McLeod, a
British citizen who was charged with murder during the burning of the
Caroline in 1837.' The Senator who introduced the bill noted that the object
was to allow a foreigner prosecuted for an offense under the authority of the
law of nations to be brought before a federal court, noting that such should "be
brought up on that issue before the only competent judicial power to decide
upon matters involved in foreign relations or the law of nations." '85
Thus, Congress in 1875, with an eye toward history, would have understood
that prior congresses had historically, and repeatedly, ensured that any type of
' Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980).
... Sosa v. Alvarez-Machin, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
'8 Id. at 725, 731-32.
182 Id. at 729.
'8 Habeas Corpus Act of 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1856).
'84 William Wiecek, The Great Writ and Reconstruction: The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,36
J. S. HIsT. 530, 535 (1970).
' Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 71 (1890).
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claim, including claims for violations of the law of nations, that could impact
foreign affairs could be heard by federal courts.
D. An Emerging Federal Common Law During the Era Also Indicates that
Congress Likely Understood and Intended that Federal Courts Would Have
Jurisdiction over, and the Ability to Recognize Private Claims for, Violations
of the Law of Nations Where Such Could Impact Foreign Affairs
Another development in the mid- to late- 1 800s weighs toward finding that
Congress likely intended federal question jurisdiction to be broad enough to
cover claims for violations of the law of nations when the claims might impact
foreign affairs. This development is the emergence of what is now termed
"federal common law" in areas unique to the federal government.
In contrast to the relatively short life of federal criminal common law, the
federal courts continued to develop and implement common law in civil cases,
even supplanting state law.186 This was exemplified by the Supreme Court in
the 1842 case of Swift v. Tyson,'87 where the Supreme Court held that in
diversity cases, federal courts should apply "general principles and doctrines"
where there was no state statutory or constitutional provision addressing the
claim, thereby supplanting state common law.188 In so finding, the Court held
that the Rules of Decision Act,'89 which mandated that state law should apply
unless the Constitution, a treaty, or an act of Congress otherwise require, did
not apply to claims involving contracts and commercial transactions. 9 ' The
Court noted that "the true interpretation and effect" of the law in these cases
should not be found in decisions of local courts, but in the "general principles
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence" as articulated by federal courts.' 9 '
In effect, the Court ruled that the Rules of Decision Act, which declared that
state law should apply in the absence of a federal constitutional provision, a
treaty, or statute, did not apply to state common law. 192 Although not
186 CASTO, supra note 107, at 162.
187 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
188 Id. at 12.
.89 The Act reads: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
'90 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 12.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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necessarily recognized as such at the time, Swift was the beginning of an
emerging federal common law. 93
To be sure, there was criticism of Swift throughout the late 1800s and
early 1900s. 1' 4 The criticism focused not only on the differing legal rules
applied in federal courts when there was diversity and in state courts when
there was not, 95 but also on the "jurisprudential underpinnings of Swift-that
there [were] objectively true principles of law" that courts simply discovered
and applied, i.e., natural law.' 96
These criticisms of Swift, occurring simultaneously with the emergence of
federal common law in certain areas, also reflected the tension between the
rights of state courts to develop and apply their own common law in matters
of local concern, and the recognition that certain types of common law
questions-those affecting the nation as a whole-should be decided by
federal courts. 97
What is now thought of as federal common law continued in the latter half
of the 1800s and into the early twentieth century, expanding into areas of
contracts, agency, insurance, and torts. 9 As scholars have noted, the
motivation behind the recognition and development of this type of federal
common law was largely economic, with a desire to create uniform national
law to help facilitate commercial transactions. 99
Admiralty was another area in which federal courts continued their
development of common law in cases over which they otherwise already had
jurisdiction. The continued development of common law in this area, in
particular with regard to collisions on the high seas, included many judicial
opinions during the latter half of the 1800s.2"
In 1 874,just one year before the enactment of federal question jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court continued to rule that federal common law was appropriate
in the field of admiralty, as otherwise "the rules and limits of maritime law
'9' See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 310.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
'9' Stephens, supra note 35, at 430-31.
198 CASTO, supra note 107, at 162; Jay, supra note 52, at 1266-70, 1274; CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 39, at 309. However, in certain local matters, state decisions controlled.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 309.
I" CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 301-08.
200 See, e.g., In re The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); In re The Belgenland, 114
U.S. 355 (1885); In re The Lamington, 87 F. 752 (D.C.N.Y. 1898).
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under the disposal and regulation of several States... would have defeated the
uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of
a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other
or with foreign states.""2 '
Although it did not apply the law of nations specifically, one important case
regarding the developing federal common law in the area of international law
was the 1984 federal district court case, Murray v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co.2°2 In Murray, which concerned an action to recover damages for
freight transportation rates, the court held that federal courts are empowered
to develop common law principles governing "matters of national control. 2 3
As an example, the court pointed in particular to international law, stating,
"The subject-matter of dealing with other nations is conferred exclusively upon
the national government, and of necessity all questions arising under the law
of nations... are committed to the national government.
21
The court further reasoned that the Constitution divided responsibility for
various areas between national and state governments, with the national
government responsible for "subjects affecting the country or people at
large. 20 5 Where there was exclusive federal control, the court noted that
federal courts should apply common law in the absence of congressional
directives.20 6 Murray was later cited with approval by the Supreme Court
in 1901.207
Such developments were consistent with the emerging common law in other
areas of uniquely federal interest, demonstrating that where the law of nations
could impact foreign relations, such was likely seen as "federal law" or "law
of the United States," by both jurists and lawyers of the era, as well as by
members of Congress.
The expansion of federal common law continued until the Supreme
Court's 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,208 which held that
there was no longer general federal common law and that state law should be
applied in each case, except in matters governed by the federal Constitution or
'o' The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (1 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874).
202 62 F. 24 (C.C. Iowa 1894).
203 Id. at 31-33, 42.
204 Id. at 32.
205 Id. at 28-29.
206 Id. at 32.
207 W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92 (1901) (holding that the Court had
jurisdiction over claims involving pricing, applying emerging federal common law to the case).
20' 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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acts of Congress.2 °9 However, as discussed below, Erie left open the
possibility that certain enclaves of federal common law would survive, and it
has been accepted that international law is one such area ever since.
1. The Differing Views Expressed in the 1871 Case Caperton v. Bowyer
Reflect an Emerging Consensus that Where the Law of Nations Impacted
Foreign Affairs, Such Was Likely Considered Federal Common Law
As mentioned above, in the 1871 case of Caperton v. Bowyer, the Supreme
Court was asked to decide, whether international law-the law of war in
particular-raised a federal question for purposes of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction;2" 0 in particular, the issue was whether a belligerent
rights defense was a question of "law of the United States." '' Although the
Court refrained from deciding the issue, the parties' discussion provides
insight into the various views expressed at the time.
In Caperton, a Virginia man, Bowyer, was thrown into prison by a provost-
marshal of the Confederate forces named Caperton for allegedly giving
information to the United States. Bowyer brought a tort suit in a Virginia
court.2"2 The defendant raised various defenses, including that he was
protected by belligerent rights under the laws ofwar.213 The plaintiff prevailed
at trial, and Virginia's highest court affirmed.2"4 The defendant filed an appeal
to the Supreme Court under its appellate jurisdiction, and the plaintiff
objected.2" 5 Among other arguments, the defendant argued that his belligerent
rights defense provided a basis for appellatejurisdiction because "international
law is a law of the United States, of the nation, and not of the several
States."2 6  The defendant relied primarily on the federal executive and
legislative branches' response to a New York state case from 1841, People v.
McLeod, where the United States's position was that it had appellate
209 Id. at 78.
210 81 U.S. 216 (1871); see also Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25, 1 Stat. 73 (providing appellate
jurisdiction where there was "drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an
authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity").
21 Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. 216, 225 (1871).
212 Id. at 216.
213 Id. at 219-21.
214 Id. at 222-23.
215 Id. at 225-27.
216 Id. at 225.
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jurisdiction over the case, even though it allowed New York to maintain
jurisdiction.217 The defendant also cited the National Intelligencer and a
speech by a United States Senator-both indicating that the Supreme Court
could have taken appellate jurisdiction over the case-- 2 1as well as letters
between the Senator and the Secretary of State.2" 9 Because the basis for
appellate jurisdiction in McLeod would have been international law, the
defendant in Caperton argued that international law should be the basis of
jurisdiction in his case.220 The defendant continued, "This indeed must be the
law, or the General Government is at the mercy, on a question of foreign
relations, of the action of a State, or of its courts."22 ' The same could be said
about the Civil War, the defendant argued, as defendants would be at the whim
or prejudice of any State court.222
The plaintiff argued that even if the case involved questions of international
law, this could not give the Court jurisdiction because, although both the
federal and state courts "recognize the law of nations as binding upon them,"
the law of nations is not "embodied in any provision of the Constitution, nor
in any treaty, act of Congress, or any authority, or commission derived from
the United States." '223 Thus, the plaintiff argued, there was no basis for federal
appellate jurisdiction.224 The plaintiff, however, conceded that an argument
might exist that the Supreme Court should be the court of last resort in cases
that could affect foreign relations-an area the federal government is
responsible for-but stated that such an argument was not applicable to the
situation at hand.225
The seeming concession aside, the different views expressed in Caperton
likely reflected the emerging resistance to the newly developing federal
common law of the era and the tension that existed between wanting to ensure
that the federal courts had jurisdiction over areas of law with which the nation
217 1 Hill 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). In this case, New York tried an officer of Great Britain,
McLeod, for events arising out of the burning of the Caroline, even though Great Britain had
recognized the act was performed pursuant to orders. Id. at 380-82. Although the United States
allowed New York to maintain jurisdiction, the Attorney General argued at trial that the United
States had appellate jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 387-91.
21 Caperton, 81 U.S. at 225-26.
219 Id. at 226.
220 Id. at 225-26.
221 Id. at 226.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 228.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 228-29.
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truly needed to speak with one voice, and those areas for which there was little
reason to impinge upon the state court's sovereignty.
As mentioned above, early in the country's history, the law of nations was
most likely seen as "law of the United States" in most contexts-even if it was
also seen as law of the several states. Given the contexts in which the law of
nations was typically applied, state courts rarely had opportunities to apply the
law of nations. This changed during and after the Civil War, when state courts
began applying the law of nations domestically.226 Such cases typically arose
when plaintiffs brought cases against defendants-mostly officers, but
sometimes citizens following the orders of officers-for assault, kidnapping,
destruction of property, unlawful takings, and the like.227 These cases were
typically based on state common law torts, with the state courts applying the
law of nations, and the law of war in particular, to defense claims, such as
belligerent rights. Even though state courts applied the law of nations, it
would likely have been viewed as infringing on state court's sovereignty to
allow such otherwise wholly domestic cases to be tried in federal courts.
At the same time, this era also began to see the first real development of a
separate federal common law,228 which seemed to lead some jurists and
lawyers to react against federal courts asserting their power to hear and decide
these cases. Some began to doubt that the law of nations was federal law in all
contexts, as epitomized in the plaintiff's argument in Caperton.2 9 Yet, many
understood that in certain areas of national concern recognizing the law of
nations as federal law was appropriate.23 In fact, these differing views can be
reconciled by understanding that, consistent with the emerging federal
common law of the era, the emerging consensus was that only where the law
of nations impacted foreign affairs was it likely considered federal law. The
Supreme Court later insinuated as much in two cases which followed a few
years after the enactment of federal question jurisdiction, discussed in more
detail below.231
226 See cases cited infra Part IV.A.2.
227 Id.
228 See Stephens, supra note 35, at 410-11, 417, 43 1.
229 See Caperton, 81 U.S. at 227-29.
230 See, e.g., id. at 228-29.
231 See infra notes 269-76 and accompanying text.
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E. Senator Carpenter Likely Believed that Federal Courts Should Have
Authority over Claims Involving the Law of Nations, but Only Where Such
Would Have Foreign Affairs Implications
It is important to understand that Senator Carpenter likely intended claims
that could affect the nation as whole to be heard in federal courts. However,
as discussed below, he likely did not intend the federal courts to usurp
jurisdiction from state courts in those cases that have no implication on foreign
affairs. Similarly, he most likely believed that cases involving the law of
nations were within Article III, and thus within the federal question statute,
where the matter impacted foreign relations but not where it was of local
concern.
For example, a speech against the Civil Rights Bill that Senator Carpenter
delivered on February 27, 1875, just days before the passage of the Judiciary
Act of 1875, suggests that he did not desire federal usurpation of state
jurisdiction.232 In the speech, Senator Carpenter indicated that although he was
an opponent of slavery and a staunch supporter of the rights of black
Americans, he felt the Civil Rights Bill was unconstitutional.233 Although he
believed the Bill was constitutional as it pertained to those federal rights,
privileges, and immunities held by black citizens, he felt the bill should not
purport to regulate conduct occurring wholly within the states, i.e., conduct not
affecting interstate commerce or impacting privileges and immunities of U.S.
citizens. 234 For example, he did not think it was constitutional to regulate who
could serve on state juries or to regulate places of accommodation within a
state.235 However, he also indicated that, to the extent commerce or activity
occurred between states, or transcended a state, restrictions on discrimination
might be constitutional.236 He explained that when a black American was
engaged in commerce between several states, it might be within Congress's
power to ensure that he was not discriminated against in public
accommodations.237 Setting aside the practical difficulties this might engender,
232 CivilRights Discussed, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1875, available at http://query.nytimes.com/
mem/archive-free/pdf?r= 1 &res--9907EEDF I 13FE73ABC405 1 DFB466838E669FDE&oref=s
login.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 id.
236 id.
237 Id.
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his point that such regulation might be permissible indicates his belief that
Congress could provide for federal jurisdiction over such situations.
Similarly, in 1880, Senator Carpenter spoke out against the consolidation
of power in the federal government through the creation of federal departments
in those areas where the Constitution did not seem to grant such power.238 In
his speech, Carpenter criticized the creation of the Department of Agriculture
and spoke out against efforts to create a Department of Agriculture, Mines and
Mining, and Manufactures, as encroachments upon the power of the states.239
He stated that only those powers conferred on the federal government either
expressly or by reasonable implication should stand.2a° However, he
recognized the federal province of foreign affairs, noting that such was an area
expressly committed to the federal government and pointing to the State
Department as an appropriate department of the federal government.241 Thus,
his comments, when read as a whole, reflect a belief that the federal judiciary
should have jurisdiction in those cases implicating, involving, or impacting
foreign affairs.242
Given Senator Carpenter's comments in these matters, it seems unlikely
that he would have intended his amendment to provide federal courts with
jurisdiction over torts or claims for injuries that occurred wholly within a state,
even if those torts were for violations of the law of nations. His comments,
however, suggest that he would have supported jurisdiction to cover those
claims "transcending" state boundaries and affecting federal interests, such as
claims for violations of the law of nations that could affect foreign relations,
and likely that he so intended federal jurisdiction to cover such claims. In fact,
this is confirmed by what was occurring in the federal courts during the years
leading up to 1875. Not only was there a growing expansion of federal
jurisdiction by Congress, there was emerging common law within the federal
courts when they had jurisdiction, as discussed earlier.243
238 The Proof of the Unconstitutionality of the Fitz John Porter Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 7, 1880,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9405E4DA173FEE3ABC4F53
DFB566838B699FDE.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Cf id.
243 See supra Part III1).
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F. Cases Following the Enactment Found that the Law of Nations Would Not
Provide for Federal Appellate Jurisdiction, but None of Those Cases Involved
Potential Impact on Foreign Affairs
Although the Supreme Court, given its analysis in Sosa, will likely give
more weight to congressional intent, reviewing case law from shortly after the
creation of the Judiciary Act provides additional insight into whether "law of
nations" was considered to be "laws of the United States."
The first case after the jurisdictional enactment to grapple with the issue of
whether a claim involving the law of nations presented a federal
question-again in the context of appellate jurisdiction-was the 1875
Supreme Court case of New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren.2" The Court
found the claim did not present a federal question.245 However, the case was
not one that could affect foreign affairs; it was a wholly domestic matter.246
In addition, a strong dissent reflects the differing views first set forth in
Caperton,247 as well as the tensions of the time regarding jurisdiction and the
emerging federal common law, especially in the area of the foreign relations.248
In Hendren, the Court reviewed whether the law of nations arose under the
laws of the United States, not for federal question jurisdiction, but for the
appellate jurisdiction. 249 The case involved the effect of the Civil War upon
insurance contracts.25 ° In the case, a New York life insurance company had
issued a life insurance policy to a woman on behalf of her husband, both of
whom resided in Virginia. 21 The insurance company argued that it was
exempted from the obligations of the insurance contract due to the war
between the insured's government (the Confederacy) and the government of
the insurance company.2
The Court held that to the degree the question rested on the general law of
nations, no federal question was presented, unless it was contended that the
general rules had been "modified or suspended" by the laws of the United
244 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
245 Id. at 286-87.
246 Id.
247 Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. 216 (1871).
248 Hendren, 92 U.S. at 287-88.
249 See id. at 286-87.
250 Id. at 286.
251' The plaintiff had brought suit in Virginia and had received a judgment in her favor. Id.
at 286.
252 Id. at 287.
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States.253 The Court treated the question as one of general public law,
suggesting that the law of war was a type of general common law available to
and applicable in all courts, but not a federal question.25 4
The opinion drew a vigorous dissent by Justice Bradley, epitomizing the
strong disagreement at the time about whether application of the law of nations
presented a federal question, especially where such application fell within the
ambit of war or relations with the enemy.25 Bradley wrote:
When a citizen of the United States claims exemption from the
ordinary obligations of a contract by reason of the existence of a
war between his government and that of the other parties to it, the
claim is made under the laws of the United States by which trade
and intercourse with the enemy are forbidden. 6
He further stated that "international law has the force of law in our courts,
because it is adopted and used by the United States., 257 He continued:
[T]he laws which the citizens of the United States are to obey in
regard to intercourse with a nation or people with which they are
at war are laws of the United States.... [Whether these laws] be
the unwritten international law. . . or the express regulations of
the government[,] ... in both cases it is the law of the United
States for the time being, whether written or unwritten.5
Thus, Justice Bradley would have found appellate jurisdiction based on the
federal government's authority to declare and wage war. Critically, he noted
the importance of ensuring uniformity and the final word by the national
government on these types of matters. 9
The majority in Hendren distinguished the case from one decided earlier
in the same term, Matthews v. McStea.26 ° In Matthews, the Court was
presented with the question of whether a proclamation by President Lincoln
253 Id. at 286-87.
254 Id. at 287.
251 See id. at 287-88 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 288 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
259 Id.
260 Id. at 287.
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altered the normal principle of the law of war that commerce between citizens
or powers at war is suspended upon the declaration of war.26 The defendant
in the case, Matthews, was sued by McStea on a bill of exchange, Matthews
having been a partner in the firm that accepted the bill.262 Matthews argued
that the partnership was dissolved before the bill of exchange was accepted
due to President Lincoln's April 19, 1861 declaration of a blockade.263 The
Matthews Court found that the proclamation and other activity did alter the
general rule of war, and that the partnership was valid.2" The Hendren Court
noted that in Matthews, it was the President's proclamation altering the rules
of war that presented a federal question, and that nothing of that kind existed
in the case before it.26
5
However, that legal distinction is not completely convincing. In Matthews,
the Court looked to the laws of war to determine when commerce should be
suspended in times of war, and when exceptions should be made.266 The Court
was not considering whether the proclamation was valid, but simply the effect
it had on the general principle of the law of nations at issue. In other words,
the Court looked to the law of nations to determine the general principle but
also looked to the body of law to determine applicable exceptions to the
general principle. In particular, the Court focused on when the exception that
allows trading with the enemy may be authorized by the sovereign. 267 Thus,
in both Hendren and Matthews the Court looked to the same body of law-the
law of war-to determine whether commerce was suspended during the Civil
War.
One scholar, Professor Beth Stephens, has suggested that the Hendren
decision might best be understood as part of the Court's "effort to avoid [a]
flood of cases challenging contracts formed during the Confederacy., 268
Moreover, as a practical matter, both cases involved two U.S. citizens as
parties for conduct that occurred wholly within the United States. Had either
claim potentially affected foreign affairs, or involved a foreign party (even if
the claim was for less than five hundred dollars and thus not under alienage
jurisdiction), given that the claim raised questions concerning the law of war,
261 Matthews v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7,9 (1875).
262 Id. at 8.
263 Id. at 9-10.
264 Id. at 12-13.
265 Hendren, 92 U.S. at 287.
266 Matthews, 91 U.S. at 10-12.
267 Id. at 10.
268 Stephens, supra note 35, at 428.
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it is highly questionable whether the Hendren majority would have reached the
same result.
In fact, in the 1881 case of Dugger v. Bocock,269 the Supreme Court again
refused to assert appellate jurisdiction and found no federal question where,
in applying the laws of war, a land conveyance paid for with confederacy
currency was legitimate.2 "7 However, the Court indicated that it might have
found jurisdiction if there were allegations that the payments were intended to
aid the rebellion.2 7' This suggests that if questions concerning the laws of war
impacted relationships between two sovereigns at war, then federal jurisdiction
might attach.
Another case supporting an argument that the Court likely viewed, or was
coming to view, federal question jurisdiction as granting jurisdiction in cases
affecting international relations and foreign affairs, is the Court's 1879
decision in Tennessee v. Davis.272 Davis involved removal of a state murder
charge against a federal revenue officer who killed a citizen of Tennessee in
the discharge of his duties claiming self-defense. 273  The Court granted
removal, finding it was appropriate both under the federal removal
statute-which was part of the Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875-and the
Constitution.274 The Court noted that "arising under" the Constitution included
those cases that might affect the ability of the federal government to perform
its Constitutional functions or that would affect the ability of federal officials
to engage in their duties.275 If such was not the case, the Court reasoned, the
federal government could not function in areas provided for in the
Constitution. 27' This case indicates that the Court may have been sympathetic
to a case that could impact foreign relations, an area the Constitution reserved
for the federal government.277
Somewhat similar to Caperton, these cases reflect the post-Swift struggle
between deciding which cases belonged in state courts for the development of
state common law and which cases implicated emerging federal common law
269 104 U.S. 596 (1881).
270 Id. at 603.
271 Id.
272 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
273 Id. at 259.
274 Id. at 263-66.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 266.
277 U.S. CONST. arts. I, II & III.
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and thus belonged in federal courts.2 78 This struggle was further complicated
by the fact that it occurred during an era that had not yet made a distinction
between federal and state common law.279 It also reflects what was "settling
in" as a legal and judicial consensus: cases which were domestic in nature,
even if they involved the law of war or the law of nations, belonged in state
courts, but cases which could affect foreign relations or sovereigns'
relationships with each other belonged in federal courts as a part of emerging
federal common law.
What should be determinative for the Supreme Court in assessing whether
the law of nations is "law of the United States" for purposes of § 1331 is
Congress's understanding when it enacted federal court jurisdiction in 1875.
When viewed against a backdrop of the emerging trends of the era, these cases
and the Hendren dissent support the theory that what Congress likely intended
was that when the law of nations affected foreign relations, it was federal law,
albeit unwritten, for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. But when itdid
not, the law of nations was not federal law, and thus such claims involving the
law of nations did not provide for federal jurisdiction under the "law of the
United States."
It seems important to acknowledge here that what "Congress intended" or
"Congress understood" is a complicated question, for many obvious reasons.
However, it is the test that the Court in Sosa has directed us to address. As
mentioned previously, it cannot be known with any degree of certainty that
Congress intended or understood that federal question jurisdiction would
include claims for violations of the law of nations, but it does seem more likely
than not that Congress would have understood or intended such jurisdiction
where the claims could affect foreign affairs, given all that was transpiring at
the time, and the issues addressed in Caperton. Members of the Judiciary
Committee and many members of Congress likely would have been aware of
the case and the issues the legal and judicial community were struggling with.
Granted, considering the near silence on the Senate floor when discussing
federal question jurisdiction and the legal experience of many of the Senators,
one could argue that members of Congress did not completely comprehend the
potential extent of federal question jurisdiction with respect to claims
involving the law of nations. It is true that no legislator can predict the future
and exactly what type of claims may be brought under either jurisdictional or
substantive statutes. However, this Article concludes that considering the
278 See Stephens, supra note 35, at 430-31.
279 See id.
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weight of evidence and what was occurring at the time, Congress did likely
intend that claims involving the law of nations that had the potential to impact
foreign affairs were considered claims involving the law of the United States
for purposes of federal jurisdiction.
IV. CONGRESS IN 1875 ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT FEDERAL COURTS
WOULD RECOGNIZE PRIVATE CLAIMS FOR VIOLATION OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS AS A MATTER OF COMMON LAW, THEREBY
AUTHORIZING THEM TO DO So
The next question that the Supreme Court directs us to address-and in
many ways is the heart of the matter-is whether Congress would have
understood, and thus authorized, federal courts to recognize private claims for
violations of the law of nations as part of the jurisdictional grant.
As the Supreme Court noted in Sosa, "torts in violation of the law of
nations would have been recognized within the common law" in the
late 1700s, 8 ° and the Founders understood that federal courts, as part of their
common law power, would recognize private causes of action for these torts
once they had jurisdiction to do so.28" ' Importantly, this continued to be the
case throughout the 1800s.
A. Both Federal and State Courts Recognized Private Claims for Violations
of the Law of Nations As a Matter of Common Law Throughout the 1800s
In the years leading up to the enactment of federal question jurisdiction,
federal and state courts routinely recognized private tort and property claims
for violations involving the law of nations absent statutory authority to do so
when they otherwise had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, assuming that
Congress intended, when it enacted federal question jurisdiction, to provide
federal courts with jurisdiction over cases involving violations of the law of
280 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
28 Id. at 720-21 (discussing Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795); Moxon v. The
Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895); and the famous 1795 opinion of Attorney
General William Bradford, in which he stated that a federal court could hear a private civil suit
for violations of the law of nations arising out of the French plunder of a British slave colony in
which Americans had taken part). The Court noted that the Attorney General's probable basis
for finding jurisdiction to hear the claim was the ATS. See id. During the era, the law of nations
was also applied to torts in the area of prize. See, e.g., Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 133, 156-57 (1795).
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nations, Congress also understood that with the jurisdictional grant, federal
courts would recognize private causes of action as part of their common law
power.
1. Federal Courts
Federal courts applied the law of nations in a variety of cases in the latter
half of the 1800s when they otherwise had jurisdiction over a case.282 In many
of these cases, federal courts recognized private claims for violations of the
law of nations as part of their common law power both before and after 1875.
At the outset, it is important to note that federal courts had recognized
private claims for violations of the law of nations in the late 1700s,283 and
in 1875, those cases were still good law. The Sosa Court cited two of these
cases to support its reasoning that Congress assumed private claims alleging
violations of the law of nations could be brought as part of the common law.2" 4
22 See, e.g., Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1,7-12 (1868) (applying the law of war,
which is described as fitting within general principles of law, in holding that a contract for the
payment of money in Confederate currency was valid because the contract at issue was used in
the regular course of business and the currency "was imposed on the community by irresistible
force"); Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439, 449 (1872) (applying principles of what
the Court called "public law"--although referring to the law of war-in finding that a bond
issued by the State of Arkansas used to fund the insurgency could not be consideration as a
matter of public policy); United States v. One Thousand Five Hundred Bales of Cotton, 27 F.
Cas. 325 (W.D. Tenn. 1872) (No. 15958) (applying the law of war regarding whether the
proceeds from the sale of cotton used to aid the rebellion should be forfeited); Williams v.
Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 185-90 (1877) (applying the law of war extensively in holding that the
Confederacy's sequestering of a Pennsylvania citizen's debts as an alien enemy was void under
the Constitution); Dainese v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 64 (1879) (applying the law of nations to
determine that a consul had judicial responsibilities, and thus was entitled to additional pay);
Willamette Iron-Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 15 (1888) (citing Penn v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co, 54 U.S. 518 (1851) as an example of where such occurred) (noting that a federal
court can apply international, state, or federal law in deciding issues under nuisance law); United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655-94 (1898) (applying international law to settle a
question of immigration).
283 See Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. 810 (citing the ATS as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit for damages
brought by a French privateer against the mortgagee of a British slave ship); Talbot, 3 U.S.
at 156 (finding that Talbot, a French citizen, who had assisted Ballard, a U.S. citizen, in
unlawfully capturing a Dutch ship had acted in contravention of the law of nations and was liable
for the value of the captured assets); Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 942 (stating that the ATS did not
conferjurisdiction in a case where a French privateer seized a British ship in U.S. waters because
the case could not be called one for a "tort only," suggesting that had it been for a "tort only,"
the ATS would have provided jurisdiction).
284 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
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The Sosa Court also cited the famous 1795 opinion of Attorney General
William Bradford, which stated that a federal court could hear private civil
claims for violations of the law of nations.285
A review of cases during the mid- to late-i 800s demonstrates that during
this time, just as it had been in 1789, private claims for violations of common
law generally, and law of nations specifically, could be brought without
statutory authorization.
a. Prize Cases
The most common type of federal cases where private claims for violations
of the laws of nations were recognized as a matter of common law was in the
area of prize,286 over which the courts had jurisdiction in admiralty. In these
cases, the question was typically whether the capture of a ship, and thus the
prize, was lawful. These cases involved essentially private claims for damages
brought by those who owned or operated the captured vessels. There was no
statute that allowed for such private claims, but the claims were recognized as
part of the federal court's common law. Such cases include the 1855 case of
Jecker, Torre & Co. v. Montgomery, where the Supreme Court entertained a
private common law claim.287 In addition, the Court in that case not only
confirmed that the law of nations is part of the domestic law of the United
States, but used its common law power to derive a rule from the law of nations
that states that trading with an enemy subjects the property to confiscation,
even if it is captured in a neutral port.288 Such cases also include the Prize
Cases,2 9 when in 1862 the Supreme Court entertained four common law
private claims in which the plaintiffs alleged that their ships' capture and
seizure as prize was unlawful. The Court extensively applied the law of
nations in determining that the blockade ordered by President Lincoln during
the Civil War was lawful, finding that the law of war applied to the nation's
Civil War, just as it would between two sovereign countries.29°
215 Id. at 721 (citing 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795)).
286 Cases involving prize were routinely brought before the federal courts during the 1800s.
In addition to the cases discussed in this Part, see also The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155 (1814)
and The Joseph, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 451 (1814).
287 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855).
288 Id. at 113.
289 67 U.S. 635 (2 Black) (1862).
290 Id. at 666-72.
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Perhaps among the most famous prize cases in which the Supreme Court
recognized a private common law claim for injuries under the law of nations,
and stated that the law of nations is part of the law of the United States, is The
Paquete Habana.29" ' In that case, the Supreme Court not only confirmed that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law," but held that private fishing vessels
owned and operated by Spaniards, who were not armed and were unaware of
the blockade issued pursuant to the Spanish War, were exempted from capture
as prize under international law.292
b. Cases Involving Acts or Orders by Military Officers
Other cases in which federal courts recognized, as a matter of common law,
private claims for both torts and property damages when they otherwise had
jurisdiction arose in cases against military officers, as well as civilians who
were obeying the orders of military officers, during times of armed conflict.
Although the claims themselves were for municipal torts, the defenses relied
on the laws of war, making the claims arguably claims for violations of the
laws of war.
For example, in the 1851 seminal case of Mitchell v. Harmony,293 a U.S.
citizen who traded, with permission of the United States in an area of Mexico
controlled by the United States, brought a claim for the common law torts of
trespass and conversion in federal court.294 The claim was against a U.S. Army
officer who seized and converted to his own use the plaintiff's horses, mules,
wagons, goods, chattels, and merchandise during the U.S.-Mexican War.29
The defendant argued that the plaintiffhad "design" to engage in trade with the
enemy, and the defendant was thus entitled to seize the property under the laws
of war.296 The Court disagreed, applying international law and discussing the
principles of the law of nations in detail to find the officer only had the right
to seize the property to prevent it from falling into enemy hands or to fulfill
some necessity-neither circumstance existed in the case.297 In rejecting the
291 175 U.S. 677 (1899).
292 Id. at 700. Although the dissent criticized the application of the law of nations as a rule
of decision in the case without authorization, it did not criticize the recognition of private claims
without specific authorization. Id. at 715 (Fuller, C.J. dissenting).
293 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
294 Id. at 137. The Court had jurisdiction due to diversity of citizenship. Id.
291 Id. at 115-16.
296 Id. at 118.
297 Id. at 133-35.
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defendant's argument, the Court allowed the private claim to go forward on
common law basis. 29
The dissent of Straughan v. United States, an 1866 court of claims case,
also demonstrates that once a court had jurisdiction, it would entertain private
claims for torts in violation of the law of nations.299 In Straughan, the wife of
a seaman whose ship was attacked by the British brought suit for "pay and
emoluments" under a federal statute imposing such payments when men of
United States' vessels were "taken by an enemy."' 00 The British alleged that
there were deserters on board, took her husband, and held him for five years.30 '
The majority found that any act of hostility was an act of war; thus the British
ship was "an enemy," allowing recovery under the statute.30 2 In so finding, the
court applied the law of nations, namely the rule that a country is responsible
for the acts of its commissioned officer.30 3 In finding that the British soldier
who ordered the capture was acting on behalf of the British government, it
found his action was an act of war; thus there could be no private tort.3°
However, had the soldier not been acting on behalf of the British government,
the implication is that there could have been a private tort. In fact, the dissent
found there was no war and thus no "enemy" for purposes of proceeding under
the federal statute.30 5 Rather, the dissent argued that the law of nations
applied, stating that the plaintiff could and should have filed a private claim for
full compensation "secured to him by the law of nations," and that the United
States would be bound to enforce any such judgment.30 6 Even the Attorney
General at the time issued an advisory opinion that the attack was not an act
of war and thus not covered by the statute, but instead was an "individual...
and private wrong."30 7
Another case in which the Supreme Court applied the law of nations and
recognized a private common law claim involving acts of the military is
the 1878 case of Ford v. Surget,a0 s which arose out of the United States Civil
290 Id. at 136-37.
299 2 Ct. Cl. 603 (1866) (Loring, J., dissenting).
31 Straughn v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 324, 1865 WL 1994 (1865) (majority opinion).
301 Id. at *1.
302 Id. at *4.
303 Id. at *5.
31 Id. The majority left open the possibility of a private wrong if the British soldier was
acting outside of his authority.
30' 2 Ct. Cl. 603, *1 (1866) (Loring, J., dissenting), available at 1866 WL 74.
306 Id.
307 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 185-86 (1849).
301 97 U.S. 594 (1878). The case was appealed from Mississippi, with the Court having
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War. Ford was a common law action for trespass against the defendant, a
civilian who, on orders from the Confederate Army, trespassed on the
plaintiff's property and burned cotton that he believed was about to be taken
and used by the Union Army.309 The defendant was acting on orders from a
provost-marshal, who in turn was acting on legislation passed by the
Confederate Congress in 1862.31" The legislation stated that it was the duty of
all military commanders in their service to destroy all cotton whenever, in their
judgment, it would likely soon fall into the hands of the United States.311 The
Supreme Court, applying the laws of war to the case, affirmed judgment for the
defendant, finding that although he was a civilian, he was protected from
liability by the laws of war because officers in the Confederate Army were
acting lawfully under the rules of war.312 Their actions were lawful because
the plaintiff was voluntarily residing within lines of insurrection.313
Nevertheless, the Court entertained the common law action, and it seems the
Court would have otherwise allowed it to go forward.
Another case involving the law of nations in the context of a tort claim
arising out of the Civil War was the 1879 case ofDow v. Johnson,314 where the
Court found that an officer of the U.S. Army could not be sued in Louisiana
state court in a civil lawsuit for injuries the plaintiff sustained when the officer
illegally entered and took the plaintiff's property. 3I" The Court looked to the
laws of war to find that the "doctrine of non-liability to the tribunals of the
invaded country for acts of warfare" was applicable to the case.316 The Court
found that the laws of war applied, but that the officer was responsible to his
"own government"--the United States, as opposed to the Confederacy-and
only to that government's tribunals, suggesting that the plaintiff could have
brought the private common law claim in a U.S. federal court.31 7
In his dissent, Justice Clifford agreed that in time of war officers and
soldiers were not amenable to civil tribunals for any act done in the
appellate jurisdiction because the plaintiff claimed that the statute the defendant was relying on
for his defense violated the plaintiff's rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution.
Id. at 597.
309 Id. at 594-97.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 602.
312 Id. at 605-06.
313 id.
314 100 U.S. 158 (1879).
315 Id. at 166-69.
316 Id. at 169.
317 Id. at 166-69.
[Vol. 37:53
JURISDICTION OVER U.S. CITIZENS' CLAIMS
performance of their duties; however, "if the injurious act done to person or
property was wholly outside of the duty of the actor, and was wilfully [sic] and
wantonly inflicted," the officer would have to answer to civil tribunals,
ostensibly for a private common law claim.318 The dissent cited the 1849 case
of Luther v. Borden,1 9 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that during a period
when martial law was imposed in Rhode Island after an insurgent uprising to
overthrow the government, an officer could be civilly accountable for acts
willfully done to an individual if the officer used more force than militarily
necessary.32 ° No specific authorization for a private claim was cited; rather,
such appears to have been a matter of common law.
A review of these cases demonstrates that federal courts recognized private
claims, including claims for violations of the law of nations, without the need
for any specific authorization during the era Congress enacted federal question
jurisdiction. The court assumed that once it had subject matter jurisdiction, it
could use its common law power to recognize a private civil claim.
2. State Courts
During this era, state courts also recognized private common law tort and
property damage claims when applying the law of war, a subset of the law of
nations.32" ' Such decisions primarily addressed whether individuals who were
part of either the Union or Confederate forces could be held civilly liable for
actions arising out of their conduct during and immediately after the Civil War.
Even though the plaintiffs did not categorize these claims as "violations of the
laws of war," but as regular state common law tort claims, the courts' analyses
of whether the laws of war allowed the tort claim or was an acceptable defense
suggests that they were, in a sense, treated as private common law tort claims
"in violation of the laws of war."
In most of the cases, state courts allowed private common law tort and
property claims to go forward after rejecting defendants' claims of belligerent
rights under the law of war. The cases include the 1866 Tennessee case of
318 Id. at 170 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
319 Id. (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)).
320 Luther, 48 U.S. at 45-46.
32 There are also examples of state courts applying the law of war in criminal cases. For
example, in the 1866 case of Riggs v. State, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 85 (1866), the Supreme Court
of Tennessee found that a soldier following lawful orders could not be charged with murder, but
that if the order was unlawful and a man of ordinary sense would know it was illegal, he could
be charged with murder, even if he was following an order of a superior.
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Cochran v. Tucker,322 where the plaintiff, a former soldier in the U.S. Army
was kidnapped, assaulted, and unlawfully imprisoned by the defendants. The
former soldier filed a tort action, and the court found that belligerent rights did
not allow attacks against citizens who were not currently combatants in the
war.32 3 Two other cases were the 1867 and 1870 cases of Hedges v. Price324
and Caperton v. Martin,325 respectively, where the Supreme Court of West
Virginia rejected belligerent rights defenses for injuries to innocent plaintiffs,
allowing private common law claims to go forward. A fourth case, decided
in 1869, Johnson v. Cox, rejected belligerent rights, found that neither the laws
of war nor the laws of nations "sanction indiscriminate plunder," and allowed
the claim to go forward.326
In addition, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in the 1869 case of Ferguson v.
Loar, allowed a private common law claim to go forward after applying the
law of nations to find that Confederate soldiers did not have the right to seize
and confiscate private property of an enemy found in Confederacy territory,
except in cases of emergency.327 Finally, in Bryan v. Walker,328 and Koonce
V. Davis, 329 the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1870 and 1875, respectively,
allowed common law private claims to proceed after applying the laws of war
to find that the defendants who had trespassed and committed theft during the
Civil War were not covered by the state's Amnesty Act 330 because the takings
did not occur pursuant to any lawful authority or state law, and did not occur
out of necessity.
322 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 186 (1866).
323 Id.
324 2 W. Va. 192 (1867). Although Hedges concerned trespass of property and taking goods,
the court's language was broad enough to include any wrong or injury. Id.
32 4 W. Va. 138 (1870).
326 3 Ky. Op. 599 (1869) (citing other Kentucky cases as well as Mitchell v. Harmony, 54
U.S. 115 (1851)).
327 68 Ky. 689 (1869) (relying on, inter alia, Mitchell, 54 U.S. 115).
328 64N.C. 141 (1870).
329 72 N.C. 218 (1875).
330 Between 1861 and 1865, parties had rights ofactions in North Carolina against individuals
who committed torts against them even if the acts were in discharge of their duties during war.
See, e.g., Franklin v. Vannoy, 66 N.C. 145 (1872). However, that changed with the passage of
the Amnesty Act in 1866, which provided that no person who had served in the U.S. government
or with the Confederate States could be liable civilly for any homicide, felony, or misdemeanor
done in discharge of his duties. Id. at 149. The Act was held constitutional in Franklin. Id.
at 151-53. In that case, the court recognized that had it not been for the Amnesty Act, every
person who had been involved with arresting "recusant" conscripts and sending them to the front
lines during the war were potentially both criminally and civilly liable for false imprisonment,
assault and battery, and other injuries. Id. at 148.
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These state cases demonstrate that when tort claims were filed and the law
of nations was applied, states also routinely allowed private common law tort
claims to go forward, without the need for any statutory authorization.
V. ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS DID NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT
THE LAW OF NATIONS, WHERE SUCH COULD IMPACT FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, CONTINUES TO BE A BODY OF COMMON LAW THAT
CAN BE DERIVED BY FEDERAL COURTS. IN FACT, THE LAW OF
NATIONS HAS SINCE BECOME SEEN AS FEDERAL COMMON
LAW IN THOSE CASES AFFECTING FOREIGN AFFAIRS
As discussed above, the Supreme Court overturned Swift v. Tyson in the
famous 193 8 case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 3 In Erie, the Court held
that there was no "federal general common law" and that in diversity cases,
state common law should apply.332 Also as discussed above in Part I, the Court
in Sosa stated that with regard to the ATS, "our holding today is consistent
with the division of responsibilities between federal and state courts after
Erie," but stated that "a more expansive common law power related to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 might not be." '333
However, the conclusion contained within this Article-that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 's jurisdictional grant allows federal courts to recognize private claims
in violation of the law of nations when such suits could implicate foreign
relations in some way-is not suggesting a more expansive common law
power that would be inconsistent with Erie. In fact, the Article's conclusion
is consistent with Erie and its holding.
Erie concerned a diversity case and the lower federal court's substitution
of its own common law in an area traditionally governed by state law.334 The
Court held that Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a state, be they commercial law or part of the law of torts,
and that "no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon
the federal courts" to develop state common law in areas not uniquely within
federal concern.335 Moreover, the Court found that in diversity cases, Swift
331 304 U.S. 64(1938). The case involved a Pennsylvania citizen suing a New York railroad
company after he was injured by an open door on a rail car while walking next to railroad tracks.
Id. at 69.
332 Id. at 78.
133 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 n.19 (2004).
334 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70-71.
331 Id. at 78.
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encouraged forum shopping and was unjust because the outcome depended on
the citizenship of the parties, leading to inconsistent results.336 The Court also
relied on an earlier handwritten draft of the First Judiciary Act, which
indicated that the drafters of the Federal Rules Decision Act had intended to
ensure that, in diversity cases, "in all matters except those in which some
federal law is controlling," state law, including state common law, was to be
followed. 337 The Court in Erie simply wanted to ensure that in diversity cases,
federal courts respect statejudicial sovereignty. Thus, it would stand to reason
that in certain areas of law which are of primary federal concern, the problems
at issue in Erie would not exist.
Moreover, on the same day the Court issued Erie, it issued another decision
written by the same author, Justice Brandeis, where the Court stated that the
question of "whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
between the two States is a question of 'federal common law,' ,338 thereby
recognizing that Erie notwithstanding, federal common law continues to exist
in certain important areas.
After Erie, scholars began arguing that certain "enclaves" of federal
common law still existed, and that one of them was the "law of nations. 339
The Supreme Court has created federal common law in this area, even post-
Erie, because of the uniquely federal interest in foreign affairs, noting that the
application of state law would frustrate the need for uniform law in this
uniquely federal area.340 For example, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, the Court applied the act of state doctrine as a matter of federal
common law in relation to claims involving the law of nations, dismissing a
336 Id. at 72-74.
337 Id. at 72-73.
33 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
I" See, for example, Stephens, supra note 35, for a lengthy argument and discussion
regarding why Erie's rejection of the general common law in federal courts did not include areas
properly governed by federal law or those with a unique federal interest, including international
law. However, in his article, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA.
J. INT'L L. 365 (Winter 2002), Ernest A. Young rejects the idea that the law of nations is federal
common law. Id. at 372. He argues that the law of nations has always been viewed as general
common law and should continue to be treated as general common law. Id. at 467, 502-03. He
further argues that whether it is applied in any given situation should be decided under a "choice
of law" analysis. Id. at 470. Moreover, he allows for the possibility that in some areas of specific
federal concern, such as foreign policy in particular, questions regarding the law of nations
should constitute a "federal question," although he advocates a narrow approach in this regard.
Id. at 502-06.
340 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1964).
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claim against Cuba by an American commodity broker for title to sugar.3 4' In
so doing, the Court noted that "[p]rinciples formulated by federal judicial law
have been thought by this Court to be necessary to protect uniquely federal
interests. 342
The U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa agreed. The Court recognized that Erie
allowed "limited enclaves" in which federal courts may derive some
substantive federal common law, and one such enclave was the law of
nations.343 The Court further noted that Congress has not taken any action to
limit this common law power.
A. No Development Has Precluded Courts from Recognizing a Claim Under
the Law of Nations as an Element of Common Law
In addition, the Court concluded that "no development in the [last] two
centuries... has ... precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under
the law of nations as an element of common law." '345 Especially important, the
Court considered whether Erie's denial of "the existence of any federal
'general' common law" foreclosed tort claims based on federal common law's
incorporation of the law of nations, and found that it did not.346
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The implications of finding that § 1331 provides jurisdiction for federal
courts to recognize private claims in violation of the law of nations where such
could impact foreign relations are twofold. First, recognizing that private
claims for violations of the law of nations can be brought under § 1331 would
result in citizens possessing the same rights non-citizens have under the
ATS. 347 As it stands now, non-citizens have more rights and remedies for
341 Id.
342 Id. at 426.
343 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004). See also id. at 730 n. 18 (noting that
Sabbatino "further endorsed the reasoning of a noted commentator who had argued that Erie
should not preclude the continued application of international law in federal courts"). See also
Casto, supra note 12, at 641 ("[T]hat there is little doubt that international law is incorporated
into United States domestic law as a form of federal common law.").
'44 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
141 Id. at 724-25 (emphasis added).
346 Id. at 726.
14' The ATS limits claims to torts. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The conclusion of this Article is
that claims should not be limited to torts, but should include those private claims for violation of
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international wrongs in U.S. courts than do U.S. citizens. This is true even if
both citizens and non-citizens would be affected by the same event, such as
genocide, war crime, or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment-an outcome
that is unjust.348 Although in 1789 Congress wanted to ensure that aliens had
a remedy for torts and that they could bring claims in federal court where they
might be afforded more fair hearings, it was the desire to protect foreign
relations that was the primary concern. In fact, in an 1893 case, In re
Hohorst, 34 9 the Supreme Court refused to interpret a statute as allowing a civil
action to be brought against a defendant only if he was an inhabitant of the
district, noting that doing so "would leave the courts of the United States open
to aliens against citizens, and close them to citizens against aliens."35 The
Court found that such a construction could not have been what Congress
intended. 5
Secondly, allowing federal jurisdiction over claims for violation of the law
of nations where such could impact foreign affairs ensures greater consistency
in cases that could affect foreign affairs. In addition, many cases that might
affect foreign affairs raise issues that run head-on into the political question
and act of state doctrines, doctrines that federal courts have more experience
analyzing and deciding. Moreover, federal courts are more likely to be
sensitive to foreign policy considerations of the federal government and may
be more apt to listen to the State Department when they choose to intervene in
such cases than state courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article concludes that general federal questionjurisdiction, now found
at 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provides jurisdiction for federal courts to recognize
the law of nations derived from common law-likely to include both torts and property damage.
348 Although the federal courts would likely have jurisdiction over any claim involving both
a citizen and a non-citizen under alienage jurisdiction, the court has a choice of law to apply.
This Article advocates that the courts should choose the law of nations to apply to claims for
violations of human rights, but there is no guarantee that such would be the case. Allowing
claims to be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for violation of the law of nations would ensure
that such law is equally applied to these claims. Where the defendant is a U.S. citizen or
corporation, the federal courts would not necessarily have jurisdiction over claims. Thus, with
the expansion of U.S. corporate activity abroad and increasing scrutiny over U.S. corporations'
role in human rights abuses, it is even more important from a fairness point of view that U.S.
citizens are allowed to bring claims for violations of the law of nations.
349 150 U.S. 653 (1893).
350 Id. at 660.
351 Id. at 659-60.
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private claims for violations of the law of nations when such claims could
impact foreign relations. This conclusion is based on the fact that when
Congress enacted federal question jurisdiction, it understood not only that the
law of nations was "law of the United States" where such could impact foreign
relations, but that federal courts would recognize private claims in violation of
the law of nations as a matter of common law. This understanding implicitly
authorized federal courts to recognize these private claims.
Circumstances under which such violations could impact foreign relations
are not subject to easy categorization, given increasing globalization and
changing world dynamics. The Court in Sosa did not limit ATS claims to the
three violations it identified the Founders likely had in mind based on the fluid
nature of developing conceptions of customary international law.352 Similarly,
the circumstances in which the law of nations is viewed to affect foreign
relations should also remain fluid. For example, a domestic question of
whether the death penalty violates customary international law might not arise
under § 1331 today given that the practice's effect on international relations
remains unclear. However, world dynamics are forever changing, and there is
the possibility such a question might affect international relations in the future,
just as one could argue that the practice of torture-even torture wholly within
the United States-arguably affects U.S. international relations today.
Finding that federal courts have the jurisdiction to recognize private claims
for violations of the law of nations as part of their common law power would
result in citizens having the same rights as non-citizens to bring such claims in
federal courts, and would also ensure greater consistency in cases that could
affect foreign affairs. Thus, in conclusion, federal courts should recognize
private claims for violations of the law of nations353 under general federal
question jurisdiction.354
352 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
... For a general discussion as to why allowing such claims to go forward will not result in a
"parade of horribles," see Casto, supra note 12, at 659-61, 663-66 (discussing the requirements
of exhaustion, duplicative remedies, immunization of federal actors overseas, and limitations due
to the Federal Tort Claims Act).
... The further implication of this Article is that even if the Supreme Court ultimately finds that
§ 1331 does not provide for such jurisdiction, where there is otherwise diversity jurisdiction, a court
could apply the law of nations as general common law of the various states in question, finding that
such practice allows the court the ability to recognize private causes of action. Similarly, in a case
involving alienage jurisdiction, where one party is a citizen and one an alien, a court could apply
the law of nations under a choice of law analysis and similarly recognize a private claim. See, e.g.,
Young, supra note 339, at 470.
2008]

